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Article 
Targeting Decisions and Consequences for 
Civilians in the Colombian Civil Strife 
Aaron X. Fellmeth & Douglas J. Sylvester 
Abstract 
The trend in armed conflicts since 1945 has moved away 
from traditional international wars and toward non-
international conflicts between the state and organized 
rebellions, criminal organizations, or terrorist cells. The 
difficulty of coping with an enemy that hides among civilians 
without causing avoidable civilian deaths and damage to civilian 
property has often been observed and, in practice, the number of 
civilian deaths in such conflicts frequently overshadows 
combatant deaths by a significant margin. Yet, it is a homily 
among international lawyers that the principle of 
proportionality applies in non-international as well as 
international conflicts under customary international law. In 
order to better understand the apparent contradiction of this 
claim with the quotidian fact of disproportionate civilian 
casualties, the authors studied the practice of Colombia in its 
decades-long civil strife against the organized armed groups 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC, and the 
National Liberation Army, or ELN. This study summarizes 
Colombian practice in training and regulating its armed forces 
with respect to the specific principle of proportionality; examines 
several incidents of allegedly disproportionate attacks; and 
analyzes the Colombian government’s response to determine 
whether it considers itself bound to comply with the 
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proportionality principle in its internal conflict and, if so, how 
the state interprets its compliance obligations with that 
principle. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The trend in armed conflicts since 1945 has moved away 
from the traditional clash between sovereign states and towards 
internal strife based on ethnic, religious, or other demographic 
factors. These conflicts are also the ones that pose the greatest 
threats to civilian populations, as the tragedies in Rwanda, the 
former Yugoslavia, the Congo, Syria, and countless zones of 
recurring hostilities such as occupied Palestine illustrate. One of 
the obstacles to adequate protection of civilians from the effects 
of non-international armed conflicts is the absence of sufficient 
and clear international legal rules restraining the combatants 
from military tactics that pose a morally unacceptable threat to 
civilian lives and property. While international law regulating 
wartime conduct, known as ius in bello,1 is highly developed, its 
application in non-international armed conflicts is contested and 
frequently uncertain.2 There is no universally accepted treaty 
applying the entire body of the international ius in bello 
developed since 1899 to civil wars, rebellions, counterterrorism 
operations, and other non-international armed conflicts. The 
 
 1. In much recent scholarship, the laws of war are often termed 
“international humanitarian law” in recognition of the modern focus on the 
protection of individuals from unnecessary harm. However, because not all laws 
of war have primarily humanitarian objectives, we adopt the more general and 
laconic terms “laws of war,” or ius in bello, here. 
 2. The uncertainty surrounding application of the laws of war to various 
conflicts has led some to conclude that they no longer serve as a viable limitation 
on state action. See generally Draft Memorandum from Alberto Gonzalez, 
White House Counsel, to President George W. Bush, Decision re. Application of 
the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War to the Conflict with al Qaeda and 
the Taliban (Jan. 25, 2002), 
http://www.hereinreality.com/alberto_gonzales_torture_memo.html. To others, 
this uncertainty has led to calls for redefinition and formulation of old rules to 
apply to various types of conflict. See, e.g., Amos N. Guiora, International Law: 
Where Have We Been; Where are We Going?, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1323 (2009) 
(advocating for a restatement of the law of armed conflict to reflect new methods 
of warfare); see also Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Questioning Civilian Immunity, 43 
TEX. INT’L L.J. 453, 483 (2008) (noting that many critiques of modern 
humanitarian law “are based upon the observation that if modern armed 
conflicts expose civilians to similar or greater risks than combatants, as is often 
the case, then the natural conclusion is that the necessity and proportionality 
principles are either consistently disregarded or are too vague to be useful in 
making responsible decisions.”). 
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most widely subscribed treaty on the subject, Additional Protocol 
II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, includes rules for 
the protection of civilians, but the protections fall short of what 
is required in its sister treaty applicable to international 
conflicts, Additional Protocol I, at least in terms of specificity.3 
The paradox of international law obligating states to protect 
“enemy” civilians with greater rigor than their own civilians 
during armed conflicts can be explained better by history than 
by policy. A state’s treatment of its own civilians was 
traditionally considered a matter of sovereign internal control, 
beyond the purview of international law.4 A government that 
victimized its own citizens in combating internal strife could 
perhaps be held responsible under its national constitution and 
laws, but, before 1945, it was not considered a matter of 
sufficient concern to the international community except in 
campaigns of widespread and severe human rights violations of 
Christians. 
Much has changed since the Second World War, however. 
The general acceptance of human dignity as a foundation of the 
world public order following the founding of the United Nations 
has transformed the international community’s view of which 
matters fall within the exclusive sovereignty of a state, and 
which fall within the realm of human rights and beyond.5 Almost 
all states now openly accept international human rights law as 
binding, and that the main provisions of the international law of 
armed conflict apply with equal vigor and scope to non-
 
 3. See Aaron Fellmeth, The Proportionality Principle in Operation: 
Methodological Limitations of Empirical Research and the Need for 
Transparency, 45 ISR. L. REV. 125, 126 (2012). 
 4. See INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON GENEVA 
CONVENTION IV RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME 
OF WAR 46 (Jean Picet ed., 1958) (observing that the reason for excluding a 
belligerent’s own nationals from the category of “protected persons” was concern 
to avoid interfering with a sovereign state’s relationship with its own nationals). 
 5. Most states now accept that the observance of international human 
rights law concerns the entire international community. See generally The 
Foundation of Human Rights Law, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en
/sections/universal-declaration/foundation-international-human-rights-law/
index.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2017). Not surprisingly, the exceptions are 
those states that systematically violate human rights. The Chinese 
government, for example, has consistently tried to deflect international 
criticism and pressure by claiming that human rights are merely an “internal 
affair.” See, e.g., Info. Office of the State Council, People’s Republic of China, 
White Paper on Human Rights in China, Nov. 1991, pt. X, 
http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/7/7-L.htm. 
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international conflicts. Among these laws is the requirement 
that combatants observe the principles of discrimination and 
proportionality when planning and directing attacks, as 
provided most explicitly in AP I.6 
Unfortunately, the coherence of the policies justifying the 
equal application of civilian protection law in international 
armed conflicts to internal conflicts has had little effect on state 
practice in some regions of the world. In the absence of specific 
treaty provisions relating to targeting in non-international 
armed conflicts, the primary source for detailed binding rules 
remains customary international law.7 For a practice to become 
binding international custom, formal doctrine dictates that it 
must be sufficiently longstanding, consistent, widespread, and 
accompanied by the belief that international law requires the 
practice (opinio iuris sive necessitatis), as opposed to being 
merely optional or advisable.8 In making the case for the 
applicability of the rules of discrimination and proportionality in 
internal conflicts, commentators and authorities have relied 
heavily on logic, policy, and public statements, but they have 
rarely studied actual battlefield practice—a reliance that has not 
gone unnoticed. The United States government, for example, has 
criticized the International Committee of the Red Cross (“ICRC”) 
for positing custom based on published sources rather than state 
practice and direct evidence of opinio iuris.9 
The common reliance on public sources is hardly surprising. 
Producing sound empirical evidence of international practice in 
armed conflicts is a daunting task. Yet, there are reasons to 
doubt whether practice in internal armed conflicts can merely be 
assumed to be identical to practice in international armed 
conflicts without extensive evidence, as any such practice 
cannot, perforce, have a long history. As noted, the laws of war 
were not viewed as applicable to a state’s treatment of its own 
 
 6. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts arts. 
51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii), (b), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 16 I.L.M. 139 
[hereinafter Additional Protocol I]. 
 7. See MICHELLE MACK & JELENA PEJIC, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, 
INCREASING RESPECT FOR INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN NON-
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS 9 (2008). 
 8. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 102(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1987). 
 9. Letter from John B. Bellinger III, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, & 
William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Def., to Jakob Kellenberger, 
President, Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross (Nov. 3, 2006), https://www.state.gov/
s/l/2006/98860.htm. 
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citizens until recently.10 In addition, whatever customary 
support may exist will have arisen in contexts radically different 
from that of classic international armed conflict. Even verbal 
statements confirming that the laws of war do apply in internal 
conflicts provide uncertain guidance on whether particular 
doctrines applicable in international conflicts govern internal 
conflicts with the same vigor. It would not be surprising to see 
states engage in a calculus to defeat the regular army of a foreign 
power quite different from the calculus in an asymmetrical 
conflict with an enemy indifferent to the safety of civilians, a 
fortiori one willing to use civilians to shield themselves from 
direct attack.11 Thus, despite strong evidence of state verbal 
support for application of the laws of war to internal conflicts, 
there is a real need to examine state practice to determine 
whether specific doctrines are customarily treated as fully 
applicable in internal wars and the manner in which they are 
interpreted. 
In pursuit of evidence of custom in non-international armed 
conflicts, we have chosen to examine one specific aspect of the 
laws of war—the doctrine of proportionality. The authors are 
currently engaged in a multinational, multi-conflict empirical 
study of state customary practice of proportionality since 1945.12 
As traditionally understood, proportionality requires military 
commanders to consider whether attacking a given target is 
“expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to 
civilians, damage to civilian objections or a combination thereof, 
which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct 
 
 10. See Richard A. Falk, Janus Tormented: The International Law of 
Internal War, in INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF CIVIL STRIFE 185, 220 (James N. 
Rosenau ed., 1964). 
 11. See Laurie E. Bank & Amos N. Guiora, Teaching an Old Dog New 
Tricks: Operationalizing the Law of Armed Conflict in New Warfare, 1 HARV. 
NAT’L SEC. J. 45, 46 (2010) (“The essence of new warfare is that states are 
engaged with non-state actors.”); Nir Eisikovits, Proportionality and Self-
Interest, 11 HUM. RTS. REV. 157, 160 (2010) (“The strict distinction between 
civilians and combatants, which just war theory has focused on, may no longer 
be the most useful guideline for protecting civilians during war. The changing 
nature of war in the last decades and specifically the rise in the frequency of 
asymmetrical conflicts require some adjustments to just war theory.”); Michael 
N. Schmitt, Military Necessity and Humanity in International Humanitarian 
Law: Preserving the Delicate Balance, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 795, 809 (2010) (arguing 
that reforms to modern humanitarian law were largely driven by “two 
factors . . . guerilla warfare . . . and the spread of non-international armed 
conflicts. Both phenomena placed civilians and their property at particular 
risk.”). 
 12. For more on the methodology of this study, see Fellmeth, supra note 3. 
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military advantage anticipated.”13 Our study will examine how 
the principle has played out in internal conflicts, and specifically 
the role it plays in targeting and planning decisions as well as 
state responses to alleged violations of the rule. To better 
understand state practice, we are using a methodology designed 
to gather empirical information beyond official governmental 
and NGO publications and news reports.14 
The purpose of this Article is to examine state practice in 
applying the proportionality doctrine to the civil strife between 
the Colombian government and two armed subversive groups, 
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (“FARC”) and the 
National Liberation Army (“ELN”), from 1982 to the present.15 
This vicious conflict, active since 1964 and still ongoing to a 
lesser extent today, is notable for the large number of intentional 
civilian killings and property damage. But it is also notable 
because it involves numerous incidents of allegedly 
indiscriminate or disproportionate attacks resulting in 
accidental but avoidable civilian casualties and property 
damage. Over the course of the conflict, it is estimated that some 
220,000 persons have been killed,16 most of them civilians, and 
many of them murdered by FARC, ELN, and paramilitary 
organizations allied with the Colombian military. Our primary 
goal is to examine the measures Colombia has taken to train and 
prepare its armed forces in proportionality doctrine, to monitor 
and enforce compliance with that doctrine, and to punish 
disproportionate attacks. By examining training and 
enforcement mechanisms and incidents of allegedly 
disproportionate attacks from this persisting conflict, we hope to 
gain some insight into the role that proportionality 
considerations play in targeting decisions made by the 
Colombian armed forces. 
 
 13. Additional Protocol I, supra note 6, arts. 51(5)(b), 57(2); see also 1 JEAN-
MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW 46 (2005). 
 14. See infra Section III.B. 
 15. We discuss the origins and development of these institutions in Section 
III.A. 
 16. CENTRO NACIONAL DE MEMORIA HISTÓRICA, ¡BASTA YA! COLOMBIA: 
MEMORIAS DE GUERRA Y DIGNIDAD 20 (2013). 
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II. PROPORTIONALITY IN NON-INTERNATIONAL 
ARMED CONFLICTS 
Although the doctrine of proportionality is now well 
established in the ius in bello, its application to non-
international conflicts is of more recent and, in some respects, 
controversial origin. As early as Grotius and gaining steady force 
throughout the eighteenth century, the notion that the “right of 
belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not 
unlimited”17 began to take shape.18 Yet, a proportionality 
principle did not immediately emerge to protect civilians, nor 
was it yet a formal requirement of the laws of armed conflict 
before the end of the Second World War. The laws of war first 
embodied the more pressing doctrines of discrimination, which 
forbids the intentional targeting of civilians, and of military 
necessity, which prohibits the gratuitous use of force that could 
threaten civilian lives or property.19 The protective value of 
these rules is limited to those attacks that endanger civilians 
and that cannot otherwise be justified for military purposes.20 
For example, these principles protected civilians against attacks 
on undefended towns and the random destruction of civilian 
 
 17. Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on 
Land art. 22, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277. The incorporation of the doctrine into 
international law can be traced back to the St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868, 
which states in its preamble that, because the only legitimate purpose of 
warfare can be to weaken the military forces of one’s opponent, practices that 
uselessly aggravate the suffering of combatants are illegitimate. See 
Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 
400 Grammes Weight, Nov. 29/Dec. 11, 1868, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE 
LAWS OF WAR 31 (Roberts & Guelff eds., 2d ed. 1989) [hereinafter Declaration 
Renouncing the Use of Explosives]. 
 18. Josef L. Kunz, The Chaotic Status of the Laws of War and the Urgent 
Necessity for Their Revision, 45 AM. J. INT’L L. 37, 37–38 (1951). 
 19. Although contested at times, the doctrine of necessity, as both a 
limitation on the nature of legal attacks and a basis for potential criminal 
liability, was best articulated in The Hostage Case. In that case, an American 
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg held that necessity: 
[D]oes not permit the killing of innocent inhabitants for purposes of revenge or 
the satisfaction of a lust to kill. The destruction of property to be lawful must 
be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war. Destruction as an end in 
itself is a violation of international law. There must be some reasonable 
connection between the destruction of property and the overcoming of the 
enemy forces. 
United States v. List (The Hostage Case), Case No. 7 (Feb. 19, 1948), reprinted 
in 11 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY 
TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL OF COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 1253–54 (1950). 
 20. Fellmeth, supra note 2, at 455, 484. 
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property.21 As late as 1952, international lawyers continued to 
view the principle of discrimination as the principal limitation 
under customary international law protecting civilians during 
an armed attack.22 
However, once the idea that the purpose of warfare was 
limited to weakening the military forces of the enemy became 
widely accepted,23 more detailed legal regulation of the means of 
attack naturally followed. Throughout the nineteenth century, 
various regimes were developed to control weapons and tactics 
viewed as unnecessarily indiscriminate in their ability to 
distinguish between military targets and civilians or civilian 
property, and unnecessarily cruel in their effects on their 
victims, whether combatant or civilian. The focus was mainly on 
indiscriminate weapons or weapons causing needless suffering, 
such as chemical weapons and exploding or flattening bullets.24 
The terrible effects of the Second World War on civilians began 
a movement to extend legal protection of civilians through a 
more developed law of war. After 1945, international lawyers, 
nongovernmental organizations (“NGOs”), and scholars began to 
argue that customary international law forbids attacks that 
even unintentionally threaten civilian safety and life if they 
cannot be justified by military necessity.25 By the early 1970s, 
 
 21. See Geoffrey Best, Restraints on War by Land Before 1945, in 
RESTRAINTS ON WAR: STUDIES IN THE LIMITATION OF ARMED CONFLICT 17, 27–
29 (Michael Howard ed., 1979). 
 22. See, e.g., Hersch Lauterpacht, The Problem of the Revision of the Law 
of War, 29 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 360, 379 (1952). 
 23. Declaration Renouncing the Use of Explosives, supra note 17, pmbl. 
(“[T]he only legitimate object which States should endeavour to accomplish 
during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy . . . .”). 
 24. See, e.g., Hague Declaration (II) on the Use of Projectiles the Object of 
Which is the Diffusion of Asphyxiating or Deleterious Gases, July 29, 1899, 
reprinted in 2 JAMES BROWN SCOTT, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES OF 1899 
AND 1907 (1909); Hague Declaration (III) on the Use of Bullets Which Expand 
or Flatten Easily in the Human Body, July 29, 1899, reprinted in SCOTT, id.; 
1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and 
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their 
Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 583, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163; Convention on 
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which 
May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects 
(with Protocols), Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter Convention on 
Conventional Weapons]. 
 25. According to Gregory Best, the work of the ICRC and numerous other 
groups began to focus on civilian protections in the laws of war after 1945. See 
Best, supra note 21, at 27. Others have discussed the changing landscape of war 
and the increasing desire to protect civilians in internal conflicts. See Josef L. 
Kunz, The Chaotic Status of the Laws of War and the Urgent Necessity for Their 
2017] COLOMBIAN CIVIL STRIFE 509 
the thinking of the leaders of the international community had 
begun to converge on the more nuanced view that, regardless of 
the precision of the weapon employed, when civilian casualties 
or property are expected as collateral damage, “the loss of life 
and damage to property must not be out of proportion to the 
military advantage to be gained.”26 The doctrine was enshrined 
in the first major supplement to the conventional laws of war 
since 1949—Additional Protocol I (“AP I”) to the Geneva 
Conventions adopted in 1977.27 
Additional Protocol I greatly expanded the protections of the 
laws of war for civilians, but its provisions apply in international 
conflicts only. Among other protections relating to methods and 
means of attack,28 AP I articulates in Article 51 the 
proportionality principle requiring military commanders to 
refrain from an attack that is expected to cause civilian 
casualties excessive in relation to the “concrete and direct 
military advantage anticipated.”29 Although the requirements of 
“direct” and “concrete” give the appearance of strict criteria, in 
practice the principle’s application remains highly subjective 
and leaves broad discretion to military commanders. Those 
states that resisted the inclusion of a proportionality principle in 
AP I did so for a variety of reasons, one of which was that the 
substance and scope of many of the rules in AP I went beyond 
customary understanding and, in some cases, could result in 
criminal liability for military commanders acting in good faith 
and with reasonable care to achieve legitimate military 
objectives.30 Nonetheless, the principle was included with strong 
support from most states, possibly because they may not have 
viewed a violation of the proportionality principle as a war 
crime. Subsequent history has borne out that expectation; there 
are exceedingly few known instances of military commanders 
 
Revision, 45 AM. J. INT’L L. 37 (1951). 
 26. Letter from J. Fred Buzhardt, Gen. Counsel of the Dep’t of Def., to 
Senator Edward Kennedy, Chairman of the Subcomm. on Refugees of the 
Comm. of the Judiciary (Sept. 22, 1972), reprinted in 67 AM. J. INT’L L. 122, 
124–25 (1973). 
 27. Additional Protocol I, supra note 6, art. 51(5)(b). 
 28. Id. arts. 51(4)(c), (5)(a). 
 29. Id. art. 51(5)(b). 
 30. For a discussion of the numerous objections raised by states to adoption 
of AP I, see Schmitt, supra note 11, at 811–14, and Fellmeth, supra note 2, at 
485–89. 
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being prosecuted criminally at the international or national level 
for having committed a disproportionate attack.31 
Regardless of whether proportionality in international 
armed conflicts possessed a strong customary basis prior to 
adoption of AP I, there is little reason to believe that 
proportionality enjoyed a similar customary basis for non-
international conflicts. Indeed, the promulgation of Additional 
Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (“AP 
II”), which was to extend humanitarian legal protection to 
noncombatants in non-international conflicts such as civil wars 
or counterterrorism operations, implicitly disclaimed a 
customary basis for extending international law’s protections for 
a state’s own citizens during internal conflicts.32 Consequently, 
the promulgation of AP II put protection for civilians in non-
international conflicts on a new conventional footing, with that 
protocol being the primary source of state legal obligations 
toward civilians beyond the lex generalis of international human 
rights law.33 
Some states willing to adhere to AP I were less enthusiastic 
about AP II. First, traditional concerns about state sovereignty, 
enhanced in the dozens of states emerging from decades of 
colonization and contested leadership, brought suspicion with 
new international rules restricting state sovereignty within the 
state’s own borders.34 In addition, it was widely, though naively, 
believed that nations were much less likely to disregard the 
safety of their own nationals during internal conflicts than 
might be the case for civilians of an enemy state.35 As a result, 
such civilians were viewed as less needful of international law’s 
protections. Finally, some states objected to the treatment of 
irregular armed forces who hide among civilian populations as 
 
 31. See Fellmeth, supra note 3, at 127–29. 
 32. Cf. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
and Relating to the Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, pmbl., Dec. 
7, 1978, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Additional Protocol II] (listing a major 
reason for the protocol as “the need to ensure a better protection for the victims 
of . . . armed conflicts.”). 
 33. See MACK & PEJIC, supra note 7. 
 34. See, e.g., Mark David Maxwell & Richard V. Meyer, The Principle of 
Distinction: Probing the Limits of Its Customariness, THE ARMY LAWYER, Mar. 
2007, at 1, http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/03-2007.pdf. 
 35. CLAUDE PILLOUD ET AL., INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, 
COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA 
CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 1449–51 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987). 
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entitled to the same privileges as regular combatants who 
readily distinguish themselves by the open wearing of uniforms 
and carrying of arms.36 Some thirty states (including the United 
States and Israel) chose not to ratify AP II. More importantly, 
unlike the rules of war in international conflicts, which most 
states readily admit qualify as customary, the customary rules 
of war in non-international armed conflicts were viewed as 
distinctly limited.37 
The relative dearth of specific protections for civilians in 
non-international armed conflicts in AP II, and the absence of 
several militarily active states from the list of parties to the 
treaty, leaves custom as the main source of detailed legal 
obligations for the protection of civilians in internal conflicts. As 
internal conflicts became increasingly prevalent and destructive 
during the politically turbulent 1980s and 90s, human rights 
advocates sought to identify customary rules to buttress their 
claims that international law mandates respect for the 
discrimination and proportionality principles in internal as well 
as international conflict. Decisions of international criminal and 
human rights tribunals,38 as well as important studies by the 
ICRC,39 argued forcefully that customary international law now 
fully incorporates the laws of war normally applicable in 
conflicts between states into purely internal conflicts. 
International lawyers, too, frequently argue that the laws of war 
applicable to the treatment of civilians in international armed 
conflicts apply equally to civilians in non-international 
conflicts.40 After all, human dignity does not vary according to 
 
 36. Id. at 1451–52. 
 37. See, e.g., Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Rule 11. Indiscriminate Attacks, 
CUSTOMARY IHL, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_
rul_rule11 (last visited Mar. 22, 2017) (demonstrating the difference between 
international and non-international conflicts when it comes to having an 
established customary law principle). 
 38. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defense 
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 119 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995) (“What is inhumane, and consequently 
proscribed, in international wars, cannot but be inhumane and inadmissible in 
civil strife.”); id. ¶ 127 (“[I]t cannot be denied that customary rules have 
developed to govern internal strife. These rules . . . cover such areas as 
protection of civilians from hostilities, in particular from indiscriminate attacks 
. . . as well as prohibition of means of warfare proscribed in international armed 
conflicts and ban of certain methods of conducting hostilities.”). 
 39. The most influential and impressive example so far is JEAN-MARIE 
HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW (2005) [hereinafter ICRC Study]. 
 40. See, e.g., Michael N. Schmitt, The Interpretive Guidance on the Notion 
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nationality. Consequently, it is desirable and logical for 
international law to protect civilians in both cases equally. 
Unfortunately, there is reason to doubt whether states 
conceive of the customary legal regime governing non-
international armed conflicts, especially the proportionality 
principle, as coextensive with that applying in international 
conflicts. To understand the state of customary international law 
in internal conflicts, it is first necessary to survey state practice 
and opinio iuris to determine whether states do in fact treat 
proportionality as an operative principle in non-international 
armed conflicts and, if so, how they interpret that principle. It is 
a platitude of modern ius in bello that the “main problem with 
the principle of proportionality is not whether or not it exists but 
what it means and how it is be applied.”41 For this, customary 
practice remains the best source for gaining insight into the 
nature and extent of proportionality in non-international 
conflicts. As a result, our project seeks to examine state practice 
with regard to this very issue and will, we hope, shed light on 
the nature and extent of the customary law content of 
proportionality in the ius in bello. Our project, in particular, 
seeks to uncover practice that may illuminate, inter alia, the 
following issues: 
• To what extent, and how, do states incorporate 
training in the proportionality principle into the 
mandatory military education of commanding 
officers? 
• By what procedures, if any, do military 
organizations make decisions whether to refrain 
from or alter an attack on proportionality grounds in 
planning and executing military operations? 
• To what extent, and how, are states influenced in 
their military engagements with domestic military 
opponents by the principle of proportionality? 
• What level of intentionality (e.g., negligence, 
recklessness) is required to subject a military 
 
of Direct Participation in Hostilities, 1 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 5, 13 (2010) (stating 
that it is “beyond dispute” that the principle of distinction, in both international 
and non-international conflicts, is part of customary international law); 
Maxwell & Meyer, supra note 34, at 10 (“The principle [of proportionality] 
transcends conflict categorization [as international or non-international].”). 
 41. INT’L CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, FINAL 
REPORT TO THE PROSECUTOR OF THE COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED TO REVIEW THE 
NATO BOMBING CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA ¶ 
48 (2000), http://www.icty.org/x/file/Press/nato061300.pdf 
2017] COLOMBIAN CIVIL STRIFE 513 
commander to responsibility for disproportionate 
attack? 
• Do states monitor compliance with the 
proportionality principle and punish commanders 
who engage in disproportionate attacks and, if so, by 
what sanctions? 
• And, in cases where insurgents or terrorists may be 
supported, politically, morally, or economically, by 
civilians, do states interpret proportionality 
differently than in cases where civilians are hostile 
to these factions? 
The present study discusses Colombia’s practice in this area 
over its principal non-international armed conflict since 1990. 
Because that conflict continued actively for many decades, it 
furnishes a particularly instructive basis for evaluating how at 
least one state has conceived and operationalized the principle. 
III. THE COLOMBIAN CIVIL STRIFE 
This section sets out the background of the Colombian 
internal conflict and analyzes a series of actions taken by the 
government to suppress or defeat FARC. These actions may shed 
some light on the substance of the proportionality doctrine in 
non-international conflicts as interpreted by Colombia. 
A. BRIEF BACKGROUND OF COLOMBIAN CIVIL STRIFE 
As of 2016, Colombia maintains a National Army with some 
237,000 active personnel, an Air Force with approximately 
13,000 active personnel, and a paramilitary National Police 
Force 159,000 strong.42 Its equipment is relatively modern, 
although for the most part it is not highly technologically 
sophisticated.43 The size and expertise of the Colombian armed 
forces is partly attributable to United States financial 
assistance, which included some $6 billion to counter-narcotics 
operations between 2000 and 2008.44 
 
 42. Int’l Inst. for Strategic Studies, Latin America and the Caribbean, 116 
MIL. BALANCE 365, 389 (2016). 
 43. See id. at 389–92. 
 44. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-09-71, PLAN COLOMBIA: DRUG 
REDUCTION GOALS WERE NOT FULLY MET, BUT SECURITY HAS IMPROVED; U.S. 
AGENCIES NEED MORE DETAILED PLANS FOR REDUCING ASSISTANCE 2 (2008). 
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Colombia faces three sets of challengers to its national 
sovereignty. The largest by far has historically been Fuerzas 
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, or FARC, which has 
historically varied in membership from about 8,000 to 17,000 
fighters.45 The much less active Ejército de Liberación Nacional, 
or ELN, was formed in 196446 and is currently comprised of 
around 2,000 members.47 A third, composed of relatively non-
unified groups of upwards of 2,600 drug traffickers armed mostly 
with light weapons, the government calls BACRIM, for Bandas 
Criminales Emergentes.48 Because it is the best organized and 
funded of the groups, as well as the most aggressive, the 
incidents in the present study primarily involved FARC. 
Although FARC’s rise can be traced back to the failure of 
agrarian reforms in the 1920s and 30s, its more immediate 
beginning arose out of a particularly bloody period in Colombia’s 
history, colloquially known as La Violencia, lasting from 1948–
58.49 Following a period of tensions between Marxist, liberal, and 
conservative political factions, the assassination of a prominent 
leftist politician, Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, in 194850 led to a 
protracted violent clash between conservative government 
soldiers, conservative and liberal guerilla units, and Marxist 
peasant militias that lasted until a military coup in 1953.51 The 
coup leader declared an amnesty, resulting in the demobilization 
of most guerilla forces.52 
Those bandoleros who refused to surrender continued 
fighting. After political factions reached an agreement in 1958, 
 
 45. Id. at 25. 
 46. Stanford University, National Liberation Army (Colombia), MAPPING 
MILITANT ORG. (Aug. 17, 2015), http://web.stanford.edu/group/mapping
militants/cgi-bin/groups/view/87. 
 47. Danielle Renwick & Claire Felter, Colombia’s Civil Conflict, COUNCIL 
ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Jan. 11, 2017), http://www.cfr.org/colombia/colombias-
civil-conflict/p9272. 
 48. See Las “Bandas Criminales Emergentes,” EL ESPECTADOR (Mar. 3, 
2009, 11:00 PM), http://www.elespectador.com/articulo123678-bandas-
criminales-emergentes; Pablo Medina Uribe, Explainer: After the FARC, 
Colombia Still Has to Face Bacrim, AMERICAS SOC’Y/COUNCIL OF THE AMERICAS 
(Jan 6, 2016), http://www.as-coa.org/articles/explainer-after-farc-colombia-still-
has-face-bacrim. 
 49. GARRY LEECH, THE FARC: THE LONGEST INSURGENCY 8, 21 
(2011). 
 50. Tasneem Jamal, Colombia (1964–First Combat Deaths), PROJECT 
PLOUGHSHARES (Mar. 16, 2012), http://www.ploughshares.ca/libraries/ACR
Text/ACR-Colombia.html#Background. 
 51. See LEECH, supra note 49, at 9–10. 
 52. Id. 
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what remained was armed communist peasant groups.53 The 
remnants of the communist rebels organized into FARC.54 FARC 
initially declared its intention to seize power in Colombia 
through “armed colonization”55 and, for more than two decades, 
organized peasant revolts in mainly rural areas throughout the 
Colombian countryside.56 FARC’s methods include ambushing 
patrols, assassinations, kidnapping and murdering Colombian 
political leaders, destroying infrastructure, recruiting child 
soldiers (about one quarter of whom are under 18 years old), and 
terrorizing villagers in the countryside.57 
During most of the conflict until the end of the Álvaro Uribe 
administration from 2002–10, the Colombian government 
denied it was engaged in an armed conflict, but instead 
characterized the conflict as a law enforcement action against 
criminal groups.58 By the early 1980s, however, FARC had 
begun to link itself to the burgeoning cocaine trade in the 
country and, backed by the immense funds from their 
participation in drug trafficking, greatly expanded its size and 
military training.59 Throughout the 1980s, it directly attacked 
the Colombian military and moved into more urban areas of the 
 
 53. Id. at 10. 
 54. See Fernán E. González, The Colombian Conflict in Historical 
Perspective, 14 ACCORD 10, 13 (2004) http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/
colombia/historical-perspective.php. 
 55. Ricardo Vargas Meza, The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 
(FARC) and the Illicit Drug Trade, TRANSNAT’L INST. (June 7, 1999), 
https://www.tni.org/en/briefing/revolutionary-armed-forces-colombia-farc-and-
illicit-drug-trade. 
 56. LEECH, supra note 49, at 16. 
 57. See MARIO A. MURRILLO & JESÚS REY AVIRAMA, COLOMBIA AND THE 
UNITED STATES: WAR, UNREST AND DESTABILIZATION 74 (2004); see also 
Colombia: Armed Groups Send Children to War, HUMAN RTS. WATCH (Feb. 22, 
2005), https://www.hrw.org/news/2005/02/21/colombia-armed-groups-send-
children-war; FARC-Civilians, UPPSALA CONFLICT DATA PROGRAM, 
http://ucdp.uu.se/#/onesided/1072 (last visited Mar. 4, 2017); HUM. RTS. WATCH, 
COLOMBIA: BEYOND NEGOTIATION: INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND 
ITS APPLICATION TO THE CONDUCT OF THE FARC-EP, pts. III, VII, VIII & IX, 
Vol. 13 No. 3B (Aug. 2001), https://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/farc/index.htm. 
 58. Interview with Senator Germán Navas Talero, May 23, 2012, 
[hereinafter Talero Interview] (on file with the author); Guillermo Otálora 
Lozano & Sebastián Machado, The Objective Qualification of Non-International 
Armed Conflicts: A Colombian Case Study, 4 AMSTERDAM L.F. 58, 65–66, 70 
(2012). 
 59. Stanford University, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – 
People’s Army, MAPPING MILITANT ORGANIZATIONS (Aug. 15, 2015), 
http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/print_view/89. 
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country.60 In addition to drug trafficking, in the 1980s FARC 
began kidnapping affluent and well-connected Colombian 
citizens and foreigners for ransom, an activity that greatly 
increased its funding and notoriety.61 
Following a series of negotiations, amnesties, 
demobilizations, and some short-lived progress toward 
reconciliation with FARC, violence once again escalated in the 
early 1990s as conservatives formed a number of paramilitary 
forces (known as the convivir) and began a campaign of extreme 
violence against FARC and other guerrilla forces.62 The level of 
violence continued to escalate between these paramilitary 
groups, suspected to be linked to the Colombian government, 
and FARC. In 2001, the United States declared FARC a “Foreign 
Terrorist Organization” subject to United States trade and 
economic sanctions63 and increased funding and military 
support for the Colombian government’s efforts to defeat 
FARC.64 FARC was also designated a terrorist organization by 
the European Union, Canada, and, of course, Colombia itself.65 
Less known than FARC, a second insurgent group, the ELN 
has also been waging war against the Colombian government 
since the mid 1960s. ELN, deeply influenced by “liberation 
theology,” was also listed as a Foreign Terrorist Organization by 
the United States66 and, since 2004, has been designated a 
terrorist organization by the European Union as well.67 ELN, 
like FARC, has used kidnapping and extortion to fund its 
campaigns against the Colombian government.68 Although in 
 
 60. LEECH, supra note 49, at 25. 
 61. Id. at 40. 
 62. Id. at 29–33; see also James Bargent, The Legacy of Colombia’s 
Vigilante Security: the Convivir, INSIGHT CRIME (May 25, 2015), 
http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/the-legacy-of-colombia-vigilante-
security-the-convivir. 
 63. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2001 REPORT ON FOREIGN TERRORIST 
ORGANIZATIONS (Oct. 5, 2001), https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rpt/fto/2001/
5258.htm. 
 64. LEECH, supra note 49, at 86–87. 
 65. Will a Peace Agreement Boost Trade and Investment in Colombia?, 
KNOWLEDG@WHARTON (Aug. 24, 2016), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/
article/will-peace-agreement-boost-trade-investment-colombia/. 
 66. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 63. 
 67. Council Decision 2005/930/EC of 21 December 2005, Implementing 
Article 2(3) of Regulation (EC) No. 2580/2001 on Specific Restrictive Measures 
Directed Against Certain Persons and Entities with a View to Combating 
Terrorism and Repealing Decision 2005/848/EC, 2005 O.J. (L 340/64). 
 68. Norman Offstein, An Historical Review and Analysis of Colombian 
Guerilla Movements: FARC, ELN and EPL, 52 DESARROLLO Y SOCIEDAD 99, 
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recent years reconciliation talks with ELN proved effective at 
reducing violence, the 2009 escape of an ELN leader from prison 
has since escalated the ELN’s profile and activity.69 
From 2002 to the present, the Colombian military has 
undertaken a series of increasingly forceful measures to defeat 
FARC and ELN.70 The declared intention of these organizations 
to seize political and military control of the country by force, and 
their willingness to flout all aspects of the laws of war, furnishes 
an instructive example of a state coping with intense and 
protracted warfare against an organized domestic armed group 
frequently integrated into civilian populations. 
B. OUR METHODOLOGY AND ITS LIMITATIONS 
Here, we summarize our methodology for identifying and 
analyzing the incidents that we deemed relevant to assessing 
the Colombian government’s interpretation of the 
proportionality principle in the Colombian civil strife. A key goal 
of the study is to move beyond formal, documentary evidence of 
customary law and to analyze actual training and battlefield 
practice and subsequent treatment of incidents by the 
Colombian military, the civilian government, and international 
institutions. This entailed a more journalistic and resource-
intensive methodology than that typically devoted to the study 
of custom. Normally, such a study might include treaty 
obligations, judicial opinions, military manuals, national 
legislation, public statements of national government officials, 
UN Security Council resolutions, and similar sources. The ICRC 
study has already covered most of this ground on a global scale.71 
Although the ICRC study received some criticism for its 
methodology, commentators implicitly endorse the study’s 
importance by almost acknowledging the nearly insuperable 
difficulty of assessing state practice and opinio iuris based on 
actual battlefield events on a global scale.72 Indeed, the 
 
112 (2003). 
 69. Jeremy McDermott, Colombia’s ELN Rebels Show New Vigour, BBC 
NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8341093.stm (last updated Nov. 5, 
2009). 
 70. Profiles: Columbia’s Armed Groups, BBC NEWS (Aug. 23, 2013), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-11400950. 
 71. See generally HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 13. 
 72. See, e.g., Michael N. Schmitt, The Law of Targeting, in PERSPECTIVES 
ON THE ICRC STUDY ON CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 131, 
135, 156 (Elizabeth Wilmhurst & Susan Breau eds., 2007). 
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International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
observed in the Tadić case: 
When attempting to ascertain State practice with a view 
to establishing the existence of a customary rule or a 
general principle, it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
pinpoint the actual behaviour of the troops in the field for 
the purpose of establishing whether they in fact comply 
with, or disregard, certain standards of behaviour.73 
In undertaking our study, we attempted to overcome these 
difficulties by examining a series of incidents of allegedly 
disproportionate attacks to determine the following: (1) which 
actors were involved; (2) which military targets were chosen of 
those reasonably available; (3) what weapons were used; 
(4) what forces and defenses the attacker faced; (5) which 
method of attack was used of those reasonably available (e.g., in 
terms of timing or approach); (6) what precautions were taken 
for the minimization of civilian casualties; and (7) what military 
advantage was expected. We began by gathering any 
information available about military training in the laws of war, 
how targeting decisions are made, the involvement of legal 
advisors in the strategic and tactical planning processes, and the 
enforcement system for alleged violations of the laws of war. For 
this, we studied Colombian legislation and military manuals, 
news sources, reports of nongovernmental and 
intergovernmental organizations, and information supplied by 
the United States government and United Nations. We also 
interviewed Colombian military representatives and prominent 
politicians. 
We then turned to studying individual incidents of allegedly 
disproportionate attack. Once we had identified a military 
engagement in which claims of disproportionate civilian 
casualties or property damage were publicized—usually through 
reports of NGOs, the news media, or intergovernmental 
organizations such as the United Nations or the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights—our next step was to gather as 
much information as possible about the circumstances and 
consequences of the engagement. These initial sources were 
 
 73. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for 
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 99 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995). 
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documentary. Any clearly intentional killing of civilians was 
factored out as irrelevant to the question of proportionality.74 
This research typically yielded a sufficient factual basis to 
determine whether a serious question of proportionality had 
been raised. When the facts were insufficiently developed to 
determine with confidence whether significant civilian 
casualties or property damage had resulted from the 
engagement, we discontinued study of the incident and moved 
on to the next. With sufficient facts, we sought further 
information on the consequences of the incident from the armed 
forces involved through published sources. In few cases were 
such sources available from military organizations, and in none 
were sources available from irregular forces such as FARC or 
ELN. This increased the importance of news sources, NGO 
reports, government publications, and, when possible, obtaining 
interviews with witnesses. In each case, we contacted the 
Colombian Embassy in Washington, D.C., and the Colombian 
Ministry of National Defense to confirm, correct, and expand our 
information about the general law of war training and 
enforcement practices, and to seek information about any 
investigation of and consequences for the claimed violation of the 
proportionality principle. We also sought information from field 
reporters and their sources, and from witnesses to the conflict to 
the extent identifiable and available. Finally, we followed up 
with interviews with Colombian military representatives and 
politicians regarding the specific incidents identified. In those 
cases in which we were unable to identify any consequences that 
were at least arguably connected to the allegedly 
disproportionate attack after extensive investigation, we noted 
the apparent absence of enforcement action. In the event that 
disciplinary action was taken, or a formal investigation was 
undertaken, we investigated and recorded the result. 
Our findings based on this methodology are subject to 
several important limitations. The first and most consequential 
is the absence of direct access to the tactical planning process of 
Colombian and FARC military commanders during the events in 
question. By nature, military planning is secretive, and 
 
 74. The challenge here was in separating those killings that were allegedly 
intentional but for which the evidence was inconclusive. Whenever any 
significant doubt existed regarding the substantiation of such allegations, we 
resolved them in favor of the assumption that the killings were accidental. This 
brought a larger number of incidents within the scope of the study while 
excluding cases in which civilians were clearly targeted in violation of the 
principle of discrimination. 
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decisions not to attack, or to change the mode of attack, in order 
to reduce civilian casualties are not susceptible to discovery 
through conventional research. The influence of the rule of 
proportionality, though invisible to the outside observer, 
nonetheless may have important consequences in practice. Not 
all legal rules operate by threat of sanction—indeed, very few do. 
Many legal rules become integrated into cultural expectations of 
rectitude and so operate psychologically with greater effect and 
universality than would be possible through threatened 
coercion. The difficulty of demonstrating empirically the 
operation of such influences leaves them susceptible to 
underestimation. Because there is no real possibility of gaining 
access to such information in the specific circumstances of this 
case, our findings should be qualified by the understanding that 
they may understate the role of proportionality in the protection 
of civilian populations in Colombia. 
A second limitation arises from the secretive nature of the 
disciplinary process in most military organizations short of 
criminal conviction.75 Gathering information about the 
consequences vel non of an alleged violation of the law of armed 
conflict is difficult in most states. It is possible that, in some 
instances, disciplinary action was taken against a commander 
who directed a disproportionate attack without the action 
becoming publicly known. There are sanctions that fall short of 
criminal prosecution or dishonorable discharge that could 
nonetheless punish and deter effectively. Whenever possible, we 
questioned our informants about whether any given incident 
could have resulted in such sanctions, but the lack of access to 
high-level Colombian officers who would know best about 
individual cases constrains the ability to discover such informal 
sanctions. 
The distortive effect of secrecy should not be overstated, 
however. A military organization that refrains from publicizing 
the consequences of a violation of ius in bello dampens the 
deterrent effect on other military commanders. This is not by 
any means to say that an unpublicized sanction is equivalent to 
no sanction at all, but silent sanctions are not conducive to the 
development of a military culture respectful of the ius in bello. A 
commitment to observing the laws of war should be a public one. 
Finally, in each case, whether a given attack was 
disproportionate in the first place remains inexorably unsettled 
 
 75. See Fellmeth, supra note 3, at 143. 
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in most cases. No information dragged from the fog of war can 
be totally beyond impeachment. The military organization 
usually perceives itself to possess a vested interest in 
suppressing publicity regarding its missteps or disrespect of 
civilian lives and property. The news media and NGOs may fail 
to verify allegations of disproportionate attacks, may misreport 
accidental deaths as intentional killings of civilians (or vice 
versa), or may under- or overstate the number of civilian or 
military casualties. The headline-grabbing effect of intentional 
executions of civilians in particular tends to overshadow reports 
of accidental, even if excessive, civilian casualties. This is 
especially true in long-running conflicts such as the Colombian 
civil strife, where “man-bites-dog” journalism may cause the 
unusual case to overshadow the normal case. An investigation 
by the self-interested military organization that ultimately 
exonerates the commander concerned cannot be disbelieved out 
of hand. At the same time, an organization’s failure to seriously 
investigate credible allegations of disproportionate attack 
speaks forcefully about the regard in which the organization 
holds the ius in bello. 
Because there is no readily available remedy for the 
deficiencies of this methodology, empirical researchers face the 
alternatives of a flawed study or none at all. So that the best 
does not become the enemy of the good, a flawed study is 
preferable to the extent that it produces at least some useful and 
accurate data and is regarded with sufficient caution. In the next 
section, we outline the various incidents we uncovered and 
investigated. 
C. BACKGROUND TO COLOMBIAN MILITARY LAW AND 
PROCEDURES 
1. Treaties and Legislation 
Since 1969, Colombia has been a party to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), which 
guarantees the human right to life.76 It has been a party to the 
Pact of San José, which also guarantees of the rights of life and 
adds a right to property, since 1973.77 Under the Colombian 
 
 76. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6(1), Dec. 16, 
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
 77. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human 
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constitution, human rights treaties apply directly in domestic 
law.78 As for the law of armed conflict, Colombia ratified the 
1949 Geneva Conventions in 1961, and both 1977 protocols in 
1993 and 1995, respectively.79 The Colombian Constitutional 
Court has proclaimed the customary status of these protocols. 
When reviewing Colombia’s ratification of them, the court wrote: 
[S]ince the principles of international humanitarian law 
embodied in the Geneva Conventions and their two 
Protocols constitute a set of minimum ethical standards 
applicable to situations of internal or international 
conflict and widely accepted by the international 
community, they form part of jus cogens80 or the 
customary law of nations. Consequently, their binding 
force derives from their universal acceptance and the 
recognition which the international community of States 
as a whole has conferred upon them by adhering to this 
set of rules and by considering that no contrary rule or 
practice is acceptable.81 
 
Rights arts. 4(1), 21, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123. 
Although a human right to property is absent from the ICCPR due to Soviet 
opposition, it is present in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as Article 
17. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. 
A/810 at 71 (1948). 
 78. CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.] art. 93. 
 79. State Parties to the Following International Humanitarian Law and 
Other Related Treaties as of 14-Feb-2017, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, 
https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/vwTreaties1949.xsp (last visited Mar. 20, 
2017). 
 80. Jus (or Ius) Cogens norms are, according to one tribunal, those that hold 
“a higher rank in the international hierarchy than treaty law and even 
‘ordinary’ customary rules [which] . . . cannot be derogated from by States 
through international treaties or local or special customs or even general 
customary rules not endowed with the same normative force.” Prosecutor v. 
Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1, Trial Chamber Judgement, ¶ 153 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998); See also Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties arts. 53 & 64, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (referring 
to “peremptory norms” of international law that cannot be circumvented by 
treaty); Alfred Von Verdross, Forbidden Treaties in International Law, 31 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 571, 572–73 (1937) (arguing that certain norms are “compulsory” or 
“contra bonos mores.”). 
 81. Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], mayo 18, 1995, 
Sentencia C-225/95, ¶ 7 (Colomb.). The English translation of this decision 
comes from MARCO SASSÒLI AND ANTOINE BOUVIER, HOW DOES LAW PROTECT 
IN WAR: CASES, DOCUMENTS, AND TEACHING MATERIALS ON CONTEMPORARY 
PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, 1357 (1999). 
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The Attorney General of Colombia has also acknowledged 
legal obligations to conduct military operations, including 
operations against FARC, in a manner that preserves civilian 
life, and to halt attacks that might present a serious danger to 
civilians.82 These statements, although acknowledging an 
international legal duty to protect civilians, give no guidance on 
the type or degree of protection required. Nor do they explicitly 
adopt “proportionality” as an applicable standard in internal 
conflicts. As discussed below, Colombia has, however, accepted 
the obligation to take reasonable precautions to protect civilians 
and civilian property from attack at all times, during peace as 
well as in and out of international and non-international armed 
conflicts. 
Colombia has a Penal Code and a Military Criminal Code 
that both prohibit war crimes. The Military Code, first adopted 
in 1958 and revised in 1988, is enforced by the Directorate of 
Military Penal Justice, part of the Ministry of Defense.83 Title 6 
of the Code prohibits intentional attacks on civilian objects; it 
does not forbid indiscriminate or disproportionate attacks on 
military targets in violation of the laws of armed conflict.84 
However, the Ministry of Defense distributes an instruction 
manual on human rights and the laws of armed conflict to 
members of its military forces.85 The manual instructs 
combatants that, among the grave violations of the laws of war 
is: 
Intentionally launching an attack, knowing it will cause 
loss of life or injury to civilians, or damage to objects of a 
civilian character, or damage of a grave, lasting and 
extensive character to the natural environment, that is 
 
 82. ICRC Study, supra note 39, Vol. II, at 348. 
 83. See Decreto 1512 de 2000, Agosto 11, 2000, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] No. 
44.125, art. 26 (Colom.). https://www.mindefensa.gov.co/irj/go/km/docs/Min
defensa/Documentos/descargas/Sobre_el_Ministerio/fondelibertad/Dec_1512_2
000.pdf. 
 84. L. 522/99, Agosto 13, 1999, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] No. 43.665, art. 174 
(Colom.) http://www.secretariasenado.gov.co/senado/basedoc/ley_
0522_1999.html. 
 85. Ejército Nacional, Jefatura de Derechos Humanos y DIH, Cartilla: 
Derechos Humanos y Derecho Internacional Aplicable a los Conflictos Armados 
– DICA (undated) (on file with the authors). 
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clearly excessive in relation to the direct and concrete 
military advantage anticipated.86 
These instructions reflect, albeit in a somewhat loose 
interpretation, the prohibition on disproportionate attack found 
in AP I. The manual does not distinguish between international 
and non-international armed conflicts in its guidance. 
The Colombian Penal Code includes a more specific chapter 
on war crimes.87 The rationale for classifying war crimes against 
civilians under the civilian penal code seems to be that such acts 
cannot be performed in the course of military duty.88 Although 
during much of the history of Colombia’s conflict, the military 
courts investigated allegations of indiscriminate or 
disproportionate attack, in 1997, the Colombian Constitutional 
Court held that acts by the military that include civilian victims 
should be decided by the civilian criminal courts.89 
The Penal Code prohibits intentionally attacking or killing 
civilians or other protected persons.90 It further prohibits the 
“use of illicit means and methods of warfare,” including those 
“destinados a causar sufrimientos o pérdidas innecesarios o 
males superfluous,” or “intended to cause unnecessary suffering 
or loss or superfluous damage.”91 In addition, the Code penalizes 
refusing to provide medical or other humanitarian assistance to 
civilians, destruction of civilian objects, and attacks on 
installations that could unleash forces dangerous to civilian 
populations.92 Finally, it prohibits the omission “of measures for 
the protection of the civilian population.”93 The Code applies at 
all times in Colombian territory, including during armed 
conflict. 
The Code unfortunately does not elaborate on which 
methods of warfare are “prohibited,” although it seems a fair 
 
 86. Id. at 74 (our translation). 
 87. CÓDIGO PENAL [C. PEN.] L. 599 de 2000, julio 24, 2000, DIARIO OFICIAL 
[D.O.] 44.007 tit. II (Colom.). 
 88. Interview with Capt. Eric Guerrero Méndez, National Army of 
Colombia, at National Army of Colombia International Law and Human Rights 
Headquarters (June 22, 2012) [hereinafter “Guerrero Interview”]. 
 89. Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], augosto 5, 1997, 
Sentencia C-358/97, (Colom.). 
 90. CÓDIGO PENAL [C. PEN.] L. 599 de 2000, julio 24, 2000, DIARIO OFICIAL 
[D.O.] arts. 103–110 (Colom.). 
 91. Id. art. 142. 
 92. Id. arts. 152–57. 
 93. Id. art. 161. 
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reading of the law that binding international law may be the 
source of such prohibition. As noted, in 1995 the Constitutional 
Court determined that the two Protocols Additional to the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949 had become customary and 
therefore applicable in international and non-international 
armed conflicts without the need for treaty ratification or 
municipal legislation.94 The court further held these rules 
applicable in the Colombian civil strife.95 These rulings seem to 
confirm that “prohibited” means and methods of warfare 
encompass violations of the international law of armed conflict, 
which define rules for the permissible conduct of military 
operations. 
In 2011, the Colombian congress enacted Law 1448, the Law 
for Victims, which provided for a relatively small amount of 
compensation (between 15 and 25 million pesos, or U.S. $5,000–
8,200) per victim of state human rights violations.96 However, 
first it must be determined that said victim was not a member 
of an illegal armed group.97 As Amnesty International has noted, 
“[g]iven that investigations into unlawful killings rarely if ever 
reach a conclusion,”98 the qualification is likely to effectively 
negate any right to reparation in all or nearly all cases. 
2. Training and Enforcement Institutions 
The Colombian National Army has several departments 
with responsibility for compliance with the international law of 
armed conflict and international human rights law.99 The 
Department of Legal Operational Counsel advises military 
commanders on compliance with these rules.100 In addition, in 
1995 the National Army created a standing Jefatura Derecho 
Internacional Humanitario y Derechos Humanos, or 
International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights 
Headquarters, to supervise compliance with the laws of armed 
 
 94. Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], mayo 18, 1995, 
Sentencia C-225/95 ¶ 7 (Colom.). 
 95. See Lozano & Machado, supra note 58, at 75. 
 96. L. 1448 de 2011, (junio 10, 2011), DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] No. 48.096 art. 
3 (Colom.). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Amnesty Int’l, Colombia: The Victims and Land Restitution Law AI 
Index MR 23/018/2012, at 8 (Apr. 2012). 
 99. See Guerrero Interview, supra note 88. 
 100. Id. 
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conflict and international human rights law by the Colombian 
armed forces.101 This directorate has three departments.102 
One of these, the Training and Prevention Department, as 
its name suggests, trains Colombian armed forces personnel in 
the requirements of ius in bello and human rights law.103 
Although the Colombian constitution has long required 
members of the armed forces to be taught the “fundamentals of 
democracy and human rights,”104 only in 2008 did its training 
program begin teaching officers and soldiers compliance with the 
international law of armed conflict, and in 2009, producing and 
distributing a training manual on the law of armed conflict and 
human rights law.105 The National Army estimates that some 
89% of staff officers—including all field officers—were enrolled 
in such a training course by 2012.106 The mandatory education 
of officers (commissioned and noncommissioned) now includes 
80 hours of human rights and humanitarian law training.107 In 
addition, this department periodically communicates 
educational information by live plays and radio transmissions, 
and has also published a training video that is handed out to 
units and made available on the National Army intranet.108 
These presentations specifically include instruction on the 
concept of proportionality.109 
The Human Rights Department receives and investigates 
complaints from alleged victims of violations of human rights 
and ius in bello, and works in coordination with the public 
prosecutor’s office in criminal cases.110 There is, in addition, a 
Department for Case Tracking that monitors the status of cases 
opened by either the military courts or civilian courts.111 
In the National Army, each brigade is assigned two 
subsections relevant to compliance with the law of armed 
 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.] art. 222. 
 105. See Guerrero Interview, supra note 88. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. An introductory presentation on the international law of armed 
conflict (in Spanish) has been provided to the authors and is available from 
them. 
 108. Id. 
 109. See e.g., id. (discussing the example of how a soldier would be trained 
to handle a civilian object, such as a church). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
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conflict: A Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law 
subsection, and a Legal Counsel.112 These subsections advise the 
commanding general and other commanding officers about their 
obligations to comply with the ius in bello and human rights law 
in the planning and execution of military operations.113 In 
addition, Operational Legal Advisors from these subsections 
specializing in operational law114 are assigned to the smaller, 
battalion level. These specialists receive special training, 
including attendance at workshops held by the International 
Committee of the Red Cross.115 
During the planning phase of an attack, the proposed 
strategy is evaluated by both a Human Rights Officer and an 
Operational Legal Advisor for its compliance with ius in bello 
and in particular its effect on civilian populations.116 
Commanding officers may ask questions of these advisors or 
seek remote guidance electronically from the department 
itself.117 After each attack, if the military unit controls the 
territory attacked, the Operational Legal Advisor will visit the 
territory to determine whether the implemented attack 
coincided with the approved plan. Through this review, 
collateral damage is assessed and compared with what was 
expected at the planning stage.118 
An officer or soldier who is found to have violated a law of 
armed conflict or rule of engagement in Colombia may be 
arrested and indicted before a court martial, should a military 
prosecutor so decide.119 However, as noted above, members of the 
armed forces accused of attacks on civilians have recently been 
subjected to criminal prosecution in the civilian court system by 
referral of a criminal lawyer in the Legal Counsel. Whether the 
trial is by court martial or criminal court, the outcome of the trial 
will be made public.120 
 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. “Operational law” includes both ius in bello and international human 
rights law. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. See generally, CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.] art. 221 
(discussing how the Colombian Constitution provides courts martial 
jurisdiction over offenses committed by members of the armed forces “on active 
service and in relation to their service”). 
 120. See Guerrero Interview, supra note 88. 
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Finally, the Colombian government has recently established 
two civilian agencies for the accountability of the military for 
human rights violations. The first is the Consejería Presidencial 
para los Derechos Humanos, or the Presidential Council for 
Human Rights, established in 2014 to coordinate state action for 
the protection of human rights and promotion of compliance with 
the international law of armed conflict.121 The second is the 
senate’s Comisión de Derechos Humanos y Audiencias, or the 
Commission for Human Rights and Hearings, which serves as 
an ombudsman to monitor and investigate government 
compliance with these same bodies of law,122 although it lacks 
trial or conviction power.123 
The consequences of conviction by trial for violation of the 
laws of armed conflict could of course include imprisonment. 
However, a convicted violator could also be subject to 
suspension, demotion, or dishonorable discharge from the 
military.124 Discharge is a severe sanction, because aside from 
job loss, the reason for the discharge will be a matter of public 
record and is likely to affect future employment prospects 
adversely.125 The least severe form of sanction is a cautionary 
note issued to the soldier and kept in his or her file.126 
D. INCIDENT REPORTS 
The incidents discussed below range from 1994 to 2008 and 
are but a small sample of the number of incidents we 
investigated. As noted, we chose to include only those incidents 
about which sufficiently reliable information could be obtained, 
and in which allegations of disproportionate attack were 
credible, to provide a factual account of civilian casualties as well 
as a reliable perspective on the Colombian government or 
military’s justifications for targeting decisions. 
 
 121. Decreto 1649 de 2014, septiembre 2, 2014, DIARIO OFFICIAL [D.O.] art. 
26 (Colom.). 
 122. See Ivanys Palencia, Comisión de Derechos Humanos y Audiencias, 
SENADO REPÚBLICA DE COLOMBIA, http://www.senado.gov.co/comisiones/
comisiones-legales/comision-de-derechos-humanos-y-audiencias (last updated 
Feb. 20, 2017). 
 123. Talero Interview, supra note 58. 
 124. See Guerrero Interview, supra note 88. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
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1. 1994 Operation Pincer 
On January 3, 1994, FARC or ELN guerrillas carried out a 
daytime assault on the Colombian army base at Saravena.127 In 
retaliation for this brazen attack, members of the Reveiz 
Pizarro—part of the Colombian army’s mechanized cavalry—
under the command of a Lieutenant Germán Dario Otálora 
Amaya, launched “Operation Pincer” against the town of Puerto 
Lleras in Arauca Department, a suspected terrorist haven.128 
The army went into Puerto Lleras with three battalions and 
support from two helicopter gunships.129 
According to witnesses, the attack on the town began with a 
hail of bullets. The Army “shot indiscriminately at unarmed 
civilians for 20 minutes, resulting in the death of . . . eight 
persons.”130 According to another witness, “the counter-guerrilla 
force shot many times . . . at civilians who were in their 
homes.”131 Following this initial assault, witnesses claim that 
the Army forced approximately five hundred civilians to 
evacuate their homes—ostensibly so that the army could search 
their homes for guerillas or evidence that they themselves were 
guerillas.132 On January 4, the Colombian National Army, 
allegedly fearing an imminent counterattack by the guerrillas, 
was observed to round up the villagers and force them onto the 
local soccer field to be used as human shields to prevent the 
counterattack.133 Part of the motivation for the attacks on 
civilians was Lt. Amaya’s belief that residents of Puerto Lleras 
were sympathetic to FARC.134 
Photographic and eyewitness evidence demonstrates that 
members of the Colombian military attempted to cover-up the 
 
 127. Amnesty Int’l, Extrajudicial Executions/Fear for Safety, AI Index AMR 
23/20/94 (Feb. 17, 1994). 
 128. Colombia v. Alexis Fuentes Guerrero et al., Case 11.519, Inter-Am. 
Comm’n H.R., Report No. 61/99, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95, doc. 7 rev. ¶ 2 (1999) 
[hereinafter Guerrero Report]; see generally UNCHR, International Protection 
Considerations Regarding Colombian Asylum-Seekers and Refugees, reprinted 
in 18 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 182, 193 (2006) (noting elevated terrorist activity in 
Arauca compared to other regions). 
 129. Amnesty Int’l, supra note 127. 
 130. Guerrero Report, supra note 128, ¶ 2. 
 131. Id. ¶ 32. 
 132. Amnesty Int’l, Further Information on UA 55/94 – Extrajudicial 
Executions/Fear for Safety, AI Index AMR 23/71/94 (Sept. 15, 1994). 
 133. See Guerrero Report, supra note 128 ¶ 3. 
 134. Id. ¶ 41. 
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civilian deaths. Soldiers apparently manipulated the bodies 
after the attack by planting firearms and dressing victims in 
combat fatigues.135 Most bodies were buried but some were made 
available to authorities after complaints were brought against 
the military.136 When authorities came to the area to investigate 
the deaths, the Colombian Army, through Lt. Amaya, showed 
them the bodies, now clothed in fatigues and armed, as evidence 
that all killed were guerrillas.137 
In February 1994, the Attorney General of Colombia 
ordered the exhumation of seven of the bodies. Autopsies 
indicated “the deaths occurred as the result of injuries inflicted 
by firearms, in some cases from a short distance.”138 A criminal 
investigation was opened against Amaya and fourteen others on 
charges of torture, unlawful detention, and aggravated 
homicide.139 Following the investigation, all of the defendants 
were indicted and arrest warrants were issued.140 On August 11, 
1995, the Attorney General Delegate for the Armed Forces 
requested that Lt. Amaya “be discharged from the Army for his 
alleged participation in crimes and human right violations.”141 
Amaya was indeed discharged following appeals, on November 
5, 1995.142 
That same month, a court martial was set up to try the 
fifteen accused soldiers. The jury in the case acquitted the 
soldiers, resulting in a setting-aside of the judge’s earlier 
verdict.143 This decision was upheld by Colombia Supreme 
Military Tribunal, which remanded the case back to the original 
judge for a new trial.144 The second trial resulted in another 
acquittal, which is a non-reviewable decision under Colombian 
law.145 
Parallel to the criminal investigation, the Attorney General 
Delegate for Human Rights also opened an investigation and 
filed charges against numerous high-ranking military officers.146 
 
 135. Id. ¶ 35. 
 136. Id. ¶ 5. 
 137. Id. ¶ 36. 
 138. Id. ¶ 5. 
 139. Id. ¶ 6. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. ¶ 7. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. ¶ 8. 
 144. Id. ¶ 9. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. ¶ 10. 
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Allegations of torture and extrajudicial killing were also referred 
to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in 1995.147 
The Commission concluded that: 
[T]here is no indication that the deaths of the victims 
occurred in circumstances that could have justified the 
action of the members of the Army 
involved . . . .Therefore, . . . State agents violated the 
right to life enshrined in Article 4 of the American 
Convention as well as the standards of common Article 3 
of the Geneva Conventions to the detriment of [eight 
identified victims] in the incident that occurred in the 
hamlet of Puerto Lleras on January 3, 1994.148 
The Commission recommended that the Republic of Colombia: 
1. Undertake a “serious, impartial, and effective 
investigation” into the events that occurred so as to put 
on trial and punish the persons responsible. 
2.  “Adopt the necessary measures to make reparation to 
the victims’ next-of-kin, including the payment of fair 
compensation.” 
3. “Adopt the necessary measures so that in the future 
the persons responsible for [similar acts] . . . may be 
judged by the regular justice system.”149 
The Commission gave Colombia one month to submit a 
report on how it would comply with the recommendations,150 but 
there is no record of Colombia having submitted a response 
within the deadline. No other information could be discovered 
regarding the final outcome of the trials and investigations 
against the soldiers. 
  
 
 147. Id. ¶ 1. 
 148. Id. ¶ 42–43. 
 149. Id. ¶ 57. 
 150. Id. ¶ 68. 
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2. Operation Lightning II in Santo Domingo 
In 1998, the Colombian military intercepted 
communications by FARC that indicated there would be a large 
cocaine shipment to Santo Domingo, Arauca (a small village 
with known ties to FARC), to occur on December 12.151 The 
military operation, known as “Relámpago II,”152 began with an 
airlift of Counter-Guerilla Battalion 36 to the jungle outside of 
Santo Domingo, from which location it launched an ambush 
attack on the FARC guerillas as they went to unload the cocaine 
from an airplane on the Santo Domingo airstrip.153 Later, the 
attack was followed by an aerial bombardment of Santo 
Domingo, apparently on the view that the town was a rebel 
stronghold.154 
The ground attack on December 12, 1998, began smoothly 
enough. Battalion 36 deployed outside the lone runway (a paved 
road) in Santo Domingo and, as a small plane landed, awaited 
the FARC guerillas’ appearance.155 Unfortunately, as the FARC 
approached the plane, it became apparent to the Battalion 36 
commander that FARC fighters were commingling with dozens 
of local civilians, including women and children, who were 
unloading the cocaine.156 The Colombian Army commander 
called off the attack, apparently out of concern for civilian 
casualties, and instead engaged FARC in the jungle rather than 
in the open where a greater military victory would be expected 
at lesser danger to Colombian soldiers.157 As a result of this 
humane decision, Battalion 36 was forced to engage in a week-
long firefight with FARC fighters in the jungles around Santo 
Domingo.158 
Notwithstanding the restraint of the ground forces, the 
Colombian Air Force, under command of Lieutenant Guillermo 
 
 151. Maria Anastasia O’Grady, Buscando la Verdad Sobre un Massacre en 
una Aldea Colombiana, EL DIARIO EXTERIOR (Oct. 5, 2005), 
http://www.eldiarioexterior.com/ForoAtlantico2/GaleriadeFotos/www.resultad
os2007.gov.ar/paginas/buscando-la-verdad-sobre-una-7054.htm. 
 152. Santo Domingo Massacre v. Colombia, Preliminary Objections, Merits 
and Reparations, Inter-AM. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) no. 259, ¶ 48 (Nov. 30, 2012). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. ¶¶ 51–57. 
 155. Id. ¶ 48. 
 156. Id. ¶ 50. 
 157. Id. ¶ 66. 
 158. Id. 
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Olaya Acevedo,159 launched the aerial bombardment of the 
village without prior warning to the inhabitants the following 
morning.160 According to NGO and news reports, the Air Force 
employed cluster-bombs and large dumb bombs161 and engaged 
in a prolonged bombardment of the village using Huey helicopter 
attack ships.162 The use of helicopters to undertake the attack, if 
true, is important to this incident, because their high degree of 
control may have allowed a clear view of their target. According 
to all reports, the bombardment occurred while many of the 
villagers had gathered in the town center to celebrate a cultural 
event.163 Many eyewitness accounts claim the helicopters 
intentionally targeted the village center and its mass of 
civilians.164 The attack resulted in the death of at least 17 
civilians, including six children, and wounded dozens more.165 In 
addition to the bombing, Colombian soldiers illegally raided 
numerous farms outside the village center166 and allegedly 
damaged homes and stole property from them.167 Finally, it 
appears ground forces moved into Santo Domingo, occupying the 
village for more than two weeks—obstructing attempts by 
civilians to seek redress with the government and destroying 
potential evidence.168 
 
 159. Id. ¶ 81. 
 160. Id. ¶ 53. 
 161. Id. ¶ 58 (describing the bombs used as having limited precision); see 
generally Rowan Scarborough, Putin’s Modern Air Force Choosing Devastating 
Dumb Bombs Over Precision Strikes, WASH. POST, (Feb. 21, 2016), 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/feb/21/russia-dropping-dumb-
bombs-in-syria-indiscriminate/ (describing how dumb bombs lack an electronic 
guidance system and are consequently highly inaccurate). In 2009, Colombia 
obtained a significant number of precision-guided air-to-ground munitions 
systems from Israel. See Colombia’s Defense Modernization, DEFENSE 
INDUSTRY DAILY, (June 23, 2009), http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/
Colombias-Defense-Modernization-05273/. 
 162. See Santo Domingo Massacre v. Colombia, Inter-AM. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) 
No. 259, ¶ 51. Despite numerous inquiries, it remains unclear whether the 
aerial bombardment was planned as a supporting attack for Battalion 36 or was 
a separate direct bombardment of the town. As it appears that the ground forces 
initially engaged FARC militia outside of the town, and most reports focus on 
the aerial bombardment, our study has focused only on that aspect of the attack. 
 163. Id. ¶ 48. 
 164. Id. ¶ 66. 
 165. Id. ¶ 53. 
 166. Id. ¶ 69. 
 167. Id. ¶ 70. 
 168. Id. 
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During the bombardment, the Colombian Air Force claims 
to have relied on intelligence provided by a private company 
known as Air Scan, a United States security contractor,169 hired 
by foreign oil companies to provide intelligence and surveillance 
for large oil fields in the area.170 Although the details are 
nebulous, Air Scan apparently provided evidence to the 
Colombian Air Force that Santo Domingo housed FARC 
guerillas and communicated bombing coordinates to Air Force 
commanders.171 Because the Colombian Air Force denies having 
bombed civilian populations in the village,172 it is unclear 
whether it perceived Santo Domingo as a legitimate military 
target. It is also unclear that there were any FARC casualties. 
However, because the Colombian armed forces believed FARC 
fighters commingled with civilians in Santo Domingo, critics 
have claimed that the Colombian Air Force knowingly attacked 
the village as a reprisal for its support for FARC.173 
Survivors of the Santo Domingo bombing brought suit in 
Colombia seeking damages and criminal prosecution against the 
pilots and commanders of the attack.174 For its part, the 
Colombian Air Force has steadfastly denied bombing the village 
directly, and in particular, has claimed the deaths in the village 
center were the result of a FARC car bomb.175 It is unclear why 
FARC would indiscriminately bomb a town that, according to the 
Colombian government, was either friendly to FARC or under 
its outright control. In 1999, following review by a Colombian 
Military Court, the investigation was closed and the Air Force 
was exonerated.176 
 
 169. See About, AIRSCAN, http://www.airscan.com/about.php (last visited 
Feb. 26, 2017). 
 170. See Masacre en Santo Domingo, Arauca, COMISIÓN INTERECLESIAL 
JUSTICIA & PAZ (Dec. 13, 2007), http://justiciaypazcolombia.com/Masacre-en-
Santo-Domingo-Arauca [hereinafter Masacre]. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Technically, a helicopter could be fitted with and use bombs, but such a 
practice is not usual because, among other reasons, a low-flying helicopter 
would not have sufficient altitude to clear the resulting blast. 
 173. See Masacre, supra note 170. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Olle Ohlsen Pettersson, Colombia Denies Blame for 1998 Massacre, 
COLOM. REP. (Jun. 29, 2012), http://colombiareports.com/colombia-denies-
blame-for-1998-massacre/. 
 176. See Santo Domingo Massacre v. Colombia, Preliminary Objections, 
Merits and Reparations, Inter-AM. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 259, ¶ 85 (Nov. 30, 
2012). 
2017] COLOMBIAN CIVIL STRIFE 535 
However, external pressure, including from the United 
States Department of State, led to reassignment of the case from 
the military to civilian justice system.177 The initial criminal 
court held a series of evidentiary hearings to determine the 
circumstances surrounding the deaths of the civilians.178 At the 
hearings, the pilots of the helicopters each testified that they had 
indeed dropped cluster bombs on the village and village center, 
but had done so under direct orders from Air Force Commander 
General Hector Fabio Velasco.179 Velasco, for his part, denied 
giving any such order, and in particular, continued to allege that 
any deaths were due to a FARC car bomb.180 As the hearings 
progressed, forensic experts from the United States Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) testified that shrapnel 
fragments taken from the victims of the bombing matched 
cluster ordnance used by the Colombian Air Force.181 Upon the 
publication of this news, the Air Force claimed that either FARC 
had obtained a cluster bomb and used it in a car bomb to frame 
the Air Force, or in the alternative, any bombs that fell on the 
town were accidentally dropped during a routine flyover.182 
Based on the evidence, the judge recommended that the case be 
referred to the Colombian Attorney General so that formal 
charges could be brought against commanders and pilots in the 
Air Force.183 In response to this finding, the United States 
Ambassador to Colombia recommended withdrawing military 
aid to the Colombian Air Force for failing to properly investigate 
 
 177. Id. n.184. In the meantime, a non-governmental organization (NGO) 
known as the International Labor Rights Fund had filed a lawsuit in the United 
States against Air Scan and an oilfield operator for their alleged role in the 
killing of civilians in Santo Domingo. See Lawsuit Filed Against Occidental 
Petroleum for Involvement in Colombian Massacre, INT’L LAB. RTS. F. (Apr. 24, 
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petroleum-involvement-colombian-massacre. Two years later, the federal court 
dismissed the case under the political question doctrine. Mujica v. Occidental 
Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1195 (C.D. Cal. 2005). 
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the incident.184 United States aid to the Colombian Air Force 
was accordingly suspended.185 
The Attorney General of Colombia, ignoring the 
responsibility of the commanding officer, charged only the 
aircrew with criminally negligent bodily harm.186 In 2011, the 
pilots were found guilty and sentenced to thirty years in prison 
following trial.187 In October 2009, the United States lifted all 
sanctions and granted $46 million to the Air Force to improve 
security at Palenque Airbase—the base where the pilots who 
conducted the bombing were stationed.188 Later that year, the 
civil court ordered the Colombian government to pay the victims 
of the bombing collectively one billion pesos (approximately 
$500,000 USD in today’s currency) as compensation.189 There is 
no record that any commanders who planned and ordered the 
assault, including Lieutenant Acevedo or General Velasco, were 
ever indicted, discharged or otherwise punished for the deaths 
at Santo Domingo. 
3. 1998 El Billar Creek Bombing 
Early in 1998, Battalion 52 had been actively engaged in 
search and destroy missions of FARC bases throughout the 
region.190 This small, lightly-armed, counter-guerrilla force was 
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meant to move quickly into jungle areas and rugged rural 
regions to locate FARC bases, and then to call in aerial attacks 
to destroy the base and kill FARC guerillas.191 There appears to 
be no evidence that Battalion 52 called in aerial bombardments, 
possibly because of the presence of large numbers of civilians 
around or intermingled with the FARC forces. As a result, each 
time a base was located, the time it would take for more 
discerning attacks to unfold (generally with larger, heavily-
equipped ground forces) would give FARC members time to 
abandon the base and disappear into the jungle. 
During this period, FARC’s military capabilities were at 
their zenith and its leaders were seeking an opportunity to 
engage and defeat Colombia’s armed forces. Over time, FARC 
began to track Battalion 52 with an intent to attack and destroy 
it. On March 2, 1998, 700 FARC fighters, heavily armed and 
well-trained, ambushed Counter Guerilla Battalion 52 at the 
small town of Peñas Coloradas.192 
As the 228 soldiers of Battalion 52 entered Peñas Coloradas 
on March 2, 1998, they were ambushed by the FARC forces.193 
On the first day, according to media reports, Battalion 52 was 
savaged with eighty soldiers killed.194 At the end of the day, 
Battalion 52 was besieged by the remaining FARC troops and a 
relief force was launched by the Colombian military to support 
the beleaguered battalion the next morning.195 
More than 1,000 Colombian soldiers, airlifted and supported 
by fighters and helicopters of the Colombian Air Force, moved in 
to support and evacuate Battalion 52.196 Initial reports were that 
the Air Force was there mainly to evacuate Battalion 52 and 
provide support where necessary.197 During the operation, bad 
weather forced a halt to rescue attempts after only forty soldiers 
had been moved out.198 As a result, to further protect Battalion 
52, the Air Force and artillery allegedly began a massive 
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bombardment of the village and surrounding areas near a 
waterway known as El Billar Creek.199 Details about the 
planning of this attack remain unclear, especially as to whether 
the attack was meant to support retreating Battalion 52 soldiers 
or as an indiscriminate attack on the area to relieve pressure on 
Battalion 52. Perhaps it was to send a message to local civilians 
suspected of supporting FARC. In the end, the result of the 
bombardment was the death of dozens of civilians, FARC 
fighters, and Battalion 52 soldiers.200 
Colombian military commanders initially insisted, “[N]o 
civilians have been affected by the army operations.”201 
However, the bombardment may have been spurred, in part, as 
an intentional “strong response” in the region intended to regain 
tactical control over the area.202 Despite international and 
domestic claims that the bombardment was a violation of the 
doctrines of either distinction or proportionality, there is no 
evidence that the Columbian government ever conducted an 
investigation.203 The authors were ultimately informed that all 
relevant commanders responsible both for the debacle that befell 
Battalion 52 and the failed rescue attempts in the days that 
followed were reassigned soon thereafter, although the 
Columbian government did not officially report any such 
measure. 
4. Operation Thánatos 
Over decades of conflict, the Colombian government has 
negotiated many cease-fires and peace agreements with 
FARC.204 As part of one negotiation, the Colombian government 
designated a large portion of southern Colombia as a 
demilitarized zone where the military would allow FARC 
freedom of movement and control.205 Over the decade of FARC 
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control, however, it was widely known that this region became a 
haven for its operations, training, and in particular, cocaine 
cultivation.206 Peace negotiations broke down in January 2002, 
when FARC resumed attacks, perpetrating more than one 
hundred assaults against Colombian military and government 
targets.207 Broken-down peace negotiations culminated in three 
acts of terrorism on February 20, 2002: the kidnapping of 
Colombian Senator Jorge Turbay, the destruction of a bridge 
linking two cities, and the hijacking of a commercial airliner.208 
Then President Andres Pastrana ordered immediate and 
massive retaliation focusing on FARC targets in the former 
demilitarized zone through “Operation Thánatos.”209 The attack 
began on February 21, 2002, with the Colombian Air Force 
bombarding the region, targeting FARC training facilities and 
infrastructure such as runways and roads.210 Following 
sustained bombardment, the Colombian National Army, with 
more than 13,000 troops, occupied the region and discovered 
more than 15,000 acres of cocaine-producing crops.211 According 
to Army statements, Operation Thánatos was an unqualified 
success.212 The Army and Air Force claimed to hit more than 
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eighty-five known FARC targets, flown more than 200 sorties 
against rebel bases and havens, and retook San Vicente del 
Cagúan, FARC’s nominal capital at the time.213 
Such an extensive operation posed obvious risks to civilians 
living in the region. FARC fighters were known to dress as 
civilians and mix with the population.214 To protect against 
accidental civilian deaths President Pastrana declared that the 
military would follow all international humanitarian legal 
requirements and avoid civilian casualties.215 A spokesman for 
the military recognized the danger of civilian casualties but 
nevertheless declared, “it”s [sic] dicey, and we will surely suffer 
casualties, but we have a moral obligation to win this war.”216 
After the bombardment, the Air Force reported deaths of three 
civilians—one adult, a fifteen-year-old girl, and a two-year-old 
boy—but viewed the deaths as unavoidable errors.217 In the end, 
however, the military admitted that none of the guerrilla leaders 
were in the demilitarized zone during the bombardment and 
that all had previously fled into the deep jungle.218 
Since Operation Thánatos, international human rights 
groups have received seventeen different reports of civilian 
casualties arising out of the bombardment.219 Also, a 
paramilitary drug trafficking group operating in collaboration 
with the Colombian National Army, known as Autodefensas 
Unidas de Colombia (“AUC”) are alleged to have attacked 
civilians in FARC territory who were believed to support 
FARC.220 The AUC had recently been declared a terrorist 
organization by several states, including the United States and 
the European Union.221 It does not appear that the Colombian 
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government ever initiated a serious investigation into civilian 
casualties. 
5. Operation Orion 
In the early hours of May 21, 2002, more than 3,000 
Colombian soldiers and police, backed by helicopter gunships, 
moved into Comuna 13, a portion of Medellin that the 
government believed to be controlled by FARC. 222 Ostensibly 
intended “to put an end to the violence that had put the residents 
of Comuna 13 in jeopardy for three years,”223 the operation began 
with helicopter strafing of the neighborhood followed quickly by 
teams of heavily armed soldiers seeking to clear buildings and 
streets.224 The government deemed the operation a large 
success.225 President Uribe and the general in charge, Mario 
Montoya, were praised both internationally and domestically for 
its success.226 
As reports trickled out about the operation, however, they 
raised questions about its proportionality. In particular, various 
reports showed deaths of at least fourteen people (claimed by 
most to be civilians only) and over dozens missing during the 
operation.227 Most of these casualties were the result of the 
spraying of the neighborhood by machine gun fire from 
helicopters overhead.228 One report noted that “[h]eroic 
neighborhood residents tried to rescue the injured and provide 
medical attention amidst a hail of bullets fired by agents of the 
state. People hung white sheets, towels, and shirts from their 
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windows to express their desire for a cease-fire . . . .”229 To make 
matters worse for residents of Comuna 13, after the military 
withdrew, the AUC was allowed to enter into the area to “clean 
up the zone of guerrillas.”230 Months later, mass graves 
containing hundreds of victims were uncovered. 231 
Over time, international human rights groups and the 
United States Central Intelligence Agency have questioned the 
success of Operation Orion.232 Although much of this criticism 
centered on the military’s connections to AUC, there has also 
been concern for the allegedly indiscriminate nature of 
helicopter support during the operation.233 Indeed, people 
reported that black hawk helicopters have poured machine gun 
shots indiscriminately before the dawn.234 Performing Operation 
Orion in a dense urban environment exacerbated the physical 
harm of indiscriminate shootings from the helicopters.235 
The hero of Operation Orion, General Montoya, came under 
increasing fire for his involvement with the AUC and, according 
to some, for his willingness to accept high civilian casualties.236 
The criticism, both at home and abroad, mounted even after 
General Montoya’s greatest successes—the rescue of 
presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt and three other United 
States defense contractors taken hostage by FARC, and the 
death of FARC leader Raul Reyes in 2008.237 As a result of the 
sustained pressure, General Montoya officially resigned as head 
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of the Colombian Army in late 2008.238 His resignation, during a 
massive wave of the firing of high-level army commanders 
suspected of human rights violations, was an apparent victory 
for the law of armed conflict.239 Indeed, Colombian President 
Uribe declared in the wake of Montoya’s resignation that 
“[e]very military unit down to the battalion level will have an 
appointed official who receives and processes allegations of 
abuse.”240 Only three months later, in February 2009, however, 
General Montoya’s political career took a more positive turn 
with his appointment as Colombian Ambassador to the 
Dominican Republic,241 a prestigious appointment to a state 
with which Colombia has no extradition treaty.242 
IV. ANALYSIS OF COLOMBIAN PRACTICE OF 
PROPORTIONALITY 
The law and training and enforcement machinery described 
in Section III.C above were not in force in Colombia during most 
of the conflict with FARC and ELN, and even AP II bound 
Colombia only after 1995.243 Nonetheless, Colombia was bound 
by Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions to afford 
human treatment to noncombatants and to respect their lives 
and bodily integrity.244 Also, although Additional Protocol II to 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions does not explicitly prohibit 
disproportionate attacks in non-international armed conflicts, 
the ICRC study on customary international humanitarian law 
asserts that the rule of proportionality applies in non-
international conflicts as a matter of binding custom.245 The 
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study observes that a large number of national military manuals 
incorporate proportionality as a rule of engagement, and many 
states have in their national criminal or military laws prohibited 
disproportionate attacks.246 The International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) has also strongly 
implied that the rule of proportionality applies under customary 
law to internal as well as international armed conflicts.247 
Moreover, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
has asserted the customary nature of the proportionality 
doctrine in non-international armed conflicts—specifically in the 
context of the conflict between the Colombian government and 
FARC.248 
Although the Colombian government has sometimes 
recognized the applicability of the international law of armed 
conflict to its internal conflict, it has not taken a clear position 
on the issue of proportionality. The public statements of the 
Colombian Supreme Court and Attorney General do not 
unequivocally confirm that the principle binds the Colombian 
military in non-international armed conflicts. They do bespeak 
recognition of a general obligation to protect civilians from the 
effects of military operations, as did President Pastrana’s 
statements during Operation Thánatos.249 The operative 
questions for purposes of our study are, first, whether the 
Colombian military and national police force have in practice 
observed a proportionality norm of some kind in the civil strife 
against FARC, ELN, and other rebel armed forces, and, if so, 
how they interpret their obligations. 
 
 246. Id. at 48. 
 247. Id. at 49, 59–60; see also Prosecutor v. Du[ko Tadi], Case No. IT-94-1-l, 
Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 119 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995) (“What is inhumane, 
and consequently proscribed, in international wars, cannot but be inhumane 
and inadmissible in civil strife.”), ¶ 127 (“[I]t cannot be denied that customary 
rules have developed to govern internal strife. These rules . . . cover such areas 
as protection of civilians from hostilities, in particular from indiscriminate 
attacks . . . as well as prohibition of means of warfare proscribed in 
international armed conflicts and ban of certain methods of conducting 
hostilities.”). 
 248. Third Report on the Human Rights Situation in Colombia, Inter-Am. 
Comm’n H. R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.102, doc. 9 rev. 1, ch. IV, ¶¶ 77–80, 106–08, 178–
89 (1999). 
 249. See generally Steven R. Ratner, The Schizophrenias of International 
Criminal Law, 33 TEX. INT’L L.J. 237, 249 (1998) (asserting that no difference 
in protecting individuals should exist between internal and interstate wars, 
referring that the goal of both customary international law and international 
human rights law is protecting individuals). 
2017] COLOMBIAN CIVIL STRIFE 545 
A. BATTLEFIELD INTERPRETATION OF PROPORTIONALITY BY 
THE COLOMBIAN ARMED FORCE 
The record of Colombian battlefield compliance with the 
principle of proportionality is distinctly mixed. The chief culprit, 
when attacks against civilians are unintentional, appears to be 
airborne attacks on ground targets in areas populated by a 
mixture of FARC fighters and civilians. Although several of the 
incidents demonstrate a strong commitment to minimizing 
unnecessary civilian casualties by Colombian ground forces, the 
number of indiscriminate or disproportionate air attacks casts 
doubt on the strength of the commitment to observing 
proportionality in Colombian military forces as a whole. In the 
1998 Relámpago II operation in Santo Domingo, the Battalion 
36 commander decided to refrain from attacking vulnerable 
FARC fighters in order to spare civilians, even at the risk of a 
less effective attack and higher Colombian Army casualties. The 
commander’s decision furnishes a model of thoughtful 
proportionality analysis, but is followed by the bombardment of 
a populated village with relatively indiscriminate ordnance. The 
Battalion 52 commander’s admirable restraint at Peñas 
Coloradas was followed by a similarly indiscriminate bombing 
campaign at El Billar Creek in 1998. Operation Orion involved 
helicopter strafing of a highly populated neighborhood, while the 
Puerto Lleras incident involved intensive bombing of a town 
populated by civilians over the course of several days, destroying 
civilian buildings and homes by the score. The usage of intensive 
aerial bombing in areas of mixed civilian and FARC population 
must be construed either as a failure to consider proportionality 
at all or an interpretation of the proportionality principle that 
imputes very little value to civilian lives and property in FARC-
controlled zones. 
The use of cluster munitions, which have minimal precision 
and maximal destructive footprint to unarmored targets, greatly 
aggravated the risk to civilians in these cases. International 
concern about the destructive effects of cluster munitions on 
civilians is sufficiently grave that most states have adopted a 
treaty banning their production and use, and committing to the 
destruction of existing stockpiles.250 
 
 250. Convention on Cluster Munitions, May 30, 2008, 2688 U.N.T.S. 39 
(entered into force Aug. 1, 2010). 
546 MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW [Vol. 26:2 
The prohibition on use of such munitions is absolute and 
applies in both international and non-international armed 
conflicts. Colombia signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions 
in 2008 and ratified it in 2015.251 Colombia was never bound by 
international law to refrain per se from using cluster munitions 
in its operations against FARC. Until Colombia ratified the 
treaty, there was no absolute ban on the use of cluster munitions 
under international law. However, the use of such munitions 
after 2008 could violate Colombia’s legal obligation to refrain 
from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of the 
Convention.252 More importantly, the fact that cluster munitions 
may themselves be permissible munitions does not give 
belligerents an unfettered privilege to use them in any armed 
conflict. The proportionality principle applies regardless of the 
type of weapon used.253 Combatants using weapons whose 
effects are difficult to control and inherently pose a greater risk 
to civilians must necessarily show greater restraint in the use of 
that weapon if they are bound by a proportionality principle. The 
main impetus for the conclusion of the Cluster Munitions 
Convention was not so much that the munitions aggravated the 
suffering of combatants unnecessarily, but rather they posed an 
unacceptable risk to civilians.254 
Also telling is the consistent absence of serious 
investigations prompted from within the Colombian military or 
national police force, and of attempts by the Colombian military 
to conceal evidence of actual events. Reported civilian casualties 
did sometimes prompt investigation (as in Operation Thánatos), 
and, in a few cases, criminal convictions for “negligent homicide” 
with compensation to the victims’ families (as in Relámpago 
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II).255 Although a military trial of the responsible air crew 
members for violating the laws of war, or more appropriately, a 
public investigation of the planning and execution of the 
attack,256 would have spoken directly to a recognition of the 
norm of proportionality in non-international armed conflicts, the 
charge of negligent homicide loosely approximates the legal 
concept and policy underlying the proportionality doctrine in the 
criminal or civil tort realm.257 
However, some incidents provoked either no investigation 
at all, as in the El Billar Creek bombing, or a trial apparently 
influenced by military solidarity, as in the Operation Pincer 
trial.258 Most disturbingly, in each case we discovered, any 
investigation that did result was prompted by external pressure 
from the United States, the Inter-American human rights 
system, or Colombian civil rights groups rather than an 
initiative of the Colombian government itself. The apparent 
impunity of higher level military commanders and the absence 
of self–motivated investigations of disproportionate attacks 
attenuates the value of the occasional criminal conviction of 
combatants or any small compensation paid to the families of 
some of the victims. Examples of publicized disciplinary action, 
which may be more appropriate in cases of bona fide 
disproportionate attacks, are exceedingly rare. 
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B. PROPORTIONALITY IN THE ABSENCE OF CIVILIAN 
IMMUNITY? 
Even more alarming than allegations of disproportionate 
attacks are those instances in which civilians have been directly 
targeted by Colombian military or paramilitary forces. On 
January 23, 1991, the Colombian National Police Special Armed 
Corps conducted a small-scale counter-guerrilla joint operation 
with the Colombian Armed Forces in Las Palmeras, located in 
the southwest of Colombia near the Ecuadorian Border.259 In the 
early morning, a Colombia Armed Forces helicopter fired from 
the air injuring a six-year–old child, Enio Quinayas, who was on 
his way to a rural school.260 Police forces on the ground arrested 
a teacher, Hernán Javier Cuarán, as he was arriving at the 
school, and detained six other unarmed civilians performing 
routine tasks.261 The police force executed six, and possibly all 
seven, of the civilians.262 After the victims’ families brought legal 
action against the Colombian Government, the National Police 
Force and the Colombia Armed Forces both opened 
investigations into the killings, but no punishment resulted.263 
“The National Police acquitted the accused officers after a five-
day internal disciplinary investigation,” while the military 
internal review remained in the investigative stage seven years 
later.264 The only fact the investigation has established is the 
victims were defenseless and performing routine daily labor 
when they were executed.265 
In 1994, two nongovernmental organizations filed a 
complaint on behalf of the victim’s families with the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights.266 The Police and 
 
 259. See Las Palmeras v. Colombia, Preliminary Objections, Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. C) No. 67, ¶ 2 (Feb. 4, 2000). 
 260. Id. 
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 263. ARGENTINE FORENSIC ANTHROPOLOGY TEAM, COLOMBIA: ANNUAL 
REPORT 2001 30–39 (2001), http://eaaf.typepad.com/pdf/2001/07
COLOMBIA.PDF; See Ann C. Mason, Constructing Authority Alternatives in 
Colombia: Globalisation and the Transformation of Governance 18 (Crisis 
States Programme, Working Paper No. 40, 2004). 
 264. Cathleen Caron, News from the Inter-American System, HUM. RTS. 
BRIEF, http://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/v7i3/newsias.htm (last visited 
Mar. 18, 2017). 
 265. See Las Palmeras v. Colombia, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) 
No. 90, ¶ 2 (Dec. 6, 2001). 
 266. See id. ¶ 3. 
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Armed Forces attempted to justify their conduct using the by-
now familiar charade of dressing the deceased in guerrilla 
camouflage uniforms, burning their civilian clothing, and 
threatening witnesses.267 After four years, the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights failed to settle the case with the 
Colombian government and set the case for trial before the Inter-
American Court on July 6, 1998.268 In 2001, the Court found the 
Colombian government responsible for the deaths of six 
victims.269 The Court also determined that the delay and 
inadequacies in the government investigations violated the 
victims’ families’ rights to open access to the judicial process, and 
ordered the Colombian Government to pay damages to the 
families of the victims.270 Colombia was also ordered to adopt 
criminal procedures to punish the responsible officers, as well as 
those involved in the subsequent cover-up.271 The Colombian 
Government complied with the indemnifications, but there is no 
evidence that it ever punished the murderers or immediately 
adopted procedures to prevent future abuses of the same kind.272 
The Pinzón case, ten years later, differs only in the details 
and the lack of international publicity. On the night of June 19, 
2001, during Operation Arawuac, the Army illegally entered a 
private home in Tame, Arauca.273 While in the house, the troops 
shot to death an 11-year-old girl, Geiny Pinzón, allegedly 
believing her a FARC member.274 The Colombian Army 
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attempted to present the child’s cause of death as part of a 
nonexistent crossfire with FARC.275 Eventually, however, the 
Army claimed negligence as the cause of death.276 Although 
many years have passed since this incident, no soldier has been 
linked to the death of Pinzón. Some have concluded that 
evidentiary errors and lack of rigor by of the military criminal 
justice system contributed to the state’s impunity.277 
That the execution or arbitrary killing of civilians, including 
children, prompted no serious investigation or punishment for 
the responsible soldiers or their commanding officers, portrays 
an inconsistent commitment, at best, by the Colombian military 
and national police force to the protection of civilians. Although 
some high-profile cases of intentional extrajudicial killings have 
resulted in criminal convictions of the soldiers responsible, such 
incidents have been swept under the rug and treated seriously 
only following a major international outcry.278 The relevance of 
these incidents to the present inquiry should be obvious. When 
extrajudicial killings can be committed with impunity, the less 
serious case of disproportionate attacks resulting in accidental 
civilian deaths can hardly be expected to prompt rigorous 
investigation and remedies. 
C. THE ROLE OF FARC WAR CRIMES 
FARC’s blatant disregard of the most fundamental rules of 
ius in bello subjects FARC commanders and fighters to potential 
criminal liability under international law as well as Colombian 
law. However, FARC military practice, unlike Colombian 
military practice, does not inform our understanding of 
customary international law. Private, irregular armed forces 
have no formal power to change the customary law relating to 
the conduct of hostilities. This does not mean, however, that 
FARC behavior has no relevance to the interpretation of 
Colombian practice with respect to the ius in bello. 
Colombia has not only a sovereign prerogative, but a 
positive human rights obligation, to resist and suppress acts by 
FARC that endanger the lives of Colombian civilians and 
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 276. See id. 
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undermine a democratically elected government.279 As 
elsewhere in asymmetrical armed conflicts, the FARC practice 
of hiding among the civilian population and using civilians for 
coerced labor and as human shields drastically increases the 
difficulty for the Colombian government of ensuring that all 
attacks minimize civilian casualties.280 
These difficulties do not excuse the Colombian government 
from compliance with the ius in bello. International law does not 
require the Colombian military forces to refrain under all 
circumstances from any attack in which civilians will be 
endangered, or are certain to suffer casualties. Common Article 
3 of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II merely 
require that Colombia treat civilians “humanely” and afford 
them “general protection” from the hostilities.281 Superimposing 
on these duties a principle of proportionality would add that 
attacks against legitimate FARC military targets may 
foreseeably result in civilian casualties so long as military 
commanders refrain from engaging in attacks likely to result in 
civilian casualties disproportionate with the expected military 
advantage. The reason civilians are in the line of fire, whether 
by accident or intentional endangerment by FARC forces, has no 
bearing on the proportionality calculus itself. But, the common 
FARC practice of mingling with civilians does make the risks to 
civilians easier to foresee. The knowledge that FARC forces are 
likely to be accompanied or surrounded by civilians would 
require Colombian military commanders to make targeting 
decisions with care and tactical finesse in order to minimize—or 
avoid altogether—civilian casualties under the principle. 
It follows that civilian deaths caused knowingly but 
unintentionally by Colombian armed forces in operations 
against terrorist organizations are permissible under ius in bello 
if the commander attempts to minimize civilian casualties and 
weighs the probability and number of such casualties against 
the military objective to be obtained. War is deadly by nature. It 
is a harsh but unavoidable reality that securing the lives of 
Colombian soldiers and civilians, and ensuring a functioning 
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and stable state government, are important goals that may 
justify the incidental loss of some civilian lives in Colombian 
military operations. 
FARC practices do not, however, justify indiscriminate 
attacks, much less intentional killings of civilians. Civilians who 
alternate between roles of FARC combatant and civilian subject 
themselves to lawful attack.282 At most, civilians who 
purposefully aid FARC forces may incur criminal liability under 
Colombian domestic law, with its accompanying guarantees 
under international human rights law of due process of law and 
a fair trial.283 They do not become subject to intentional attack 
unless they take an active part in hostilities. 
Unfortunately, civilians in towns occupied by FARC are 
assumed by some in the Colombian government to be complicit 
in FARC’s quest to disrupt and ultimately overthrow the 
Colombian government.284 Regardless of whether this 
perception is justified in any given instance, civilians not 
actively taking part in an armed conflict benefit from immunity 
to intentional attack,285 and the proportionality principle, if 
applicable, applies with vigor equal to that applicable to any 
other civilian. To the extent that any reasonable doubt exists as 
to whether a person is a FARC combatant or civilian, that doubt 
must be resolved in favor of treating the individual as a civilian 
under both international humanitarian law and international 
human rights law.286 To the extent the principle of 
proportionality protects civilians in non–international armed 
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conflicts, that protection is not contingent on civilian attitudes 
toward either the Colombian government or the FARC forces. 
International law provides no exceptions to the rules of 
discrimination or proportionality for political loyalties or 
ideology. That Colombian government officials have implied 
otherwise, even unofficially, suggests a troubling tolerance for 
the disregard of civilian immunity among government officials 
that could easily filter down to military commanders. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
Modern Colombian military practice displays a serious 
commitment to training and monitoring to prevent and detect 
disproportionate attacks. Moreover, the incidents discussed here 
do not demonstrate that in its dealings with FARC and other 
domestic terrorist groups Colombia has denied that the 
proportionality principle binds its armed forces. Our research 
has not uncovered a single incident in which a Colombian 
military or political elite has denied that the Colombian armed 
forces are obligated to refrain from disproportionate or 
indiscriminate attacks in its internal conflict. Denials by 
Colombian military commanders that accidental civilian 
casualties occurred in the face of multiple contradictory reports 
may paradoxically signify recognition of the prohibition on 
disproportionate attacks under international law in internal 
armed conflicts even while revealing either a belief in the 
attack’s compliance with the principle or else a lack of consistent 
commitment in Colombian military culture to observe the law. 
In either case, Colombian officers at the highest levels have 
historically been willing to foster a culture of impunity for 
commanders and soldiers engaged in disproportionate attacks 
rather than to articulate principles limiting attack methods for 
the protection of civilians. Colombian political authorities were 
apparently unable or unwilling to hold military commanders 
accountable, except under international pressure. 
At the same time, the role of the United States government 
and Inter-American human rights system in successfully 
pressuring Colombia to observe proportionality, to investigate 
and try combatants who commit disproportionate attacks, and 
to compensate the victims of disproportionate attacks, may 
indicate a belief among legal, political, and military elites that 
the rule of proportionality binds the government of Colombia in 
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its internal conflict without a serious commitment to enforce the 
norm. 
It is much easier to condemn the killing of civilians ex post 
facto than to avoid any casualties whatsoever in the heat of 
hostilities. The guidance of the ICTY in the Du[ko Tadi] case 
illustrates how the lawyerly temptation to judge in hindsight 
may impose unrealistic constraints on military field 
commanders: 
[I]t is unnecessary to define exactly the line dividing 
those taking an active part in hostilities and those who 
are not so involved. It is sufficient to examine the 
relevant facts of each victim and to ascertain whether, in 
each individual’s circumstances, that person was actively 
involved in hostilities at the relevant time.287 
Combatants may well be expected to judge whether an 
individual is a civilian or a dangerous enemy based on all the 
facts available to them, but the facts will often be scarce and 
more ambiguous in the life-threatening situation of armed 
combat than in a tranquil post mortem conducted in a courtroom 
or office building. 288 Nonetheless, some provisions of the 
international law of armed conflict are sufficiently unambiguous 
to provide meaningful guidance in the hottest conflict. These 
include the requirement that in case of doubt as to whether an 
individual is a civilian or combatant the individual must be 
presumed a civilian, and the prohibition on means of attack that 
are by their nature indiscriminate.289 It is hard to imagine a case 
in which attacking irregular forces by indiscriminately bombing 
an inhabited village—even a defended one—or machine-gun 
strafing from a helicopter, without prior warning to the civilians 
to evacuate, would qualify as a discriminating, much less a 
proportional, attack. 
It is unfortunate that FARC’s violations of the laws of armed 
conflict sometimes force the Colombian government to choose 
between a disproportionate attack and not attacking at all. This 
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is a challenge that nearly every professional military force 
engaging irregular combatants must confront. If the Colombian 
government does consider itself bound in its conflict with FARC 
then by a proportionality principle, it has accepted a duty to 
forgo the benefits of attack in such circumstances. This does not 
appear to describe Colombian practice, however. Our study 
reveals a tension between the desire to spare civilians from the 
worst effects of the conflict on the part of some military 
commanders with an unwillingness to exert political and 
military control at a high level to inculcate sensitivity to 
proportionality concerns and a willingness to investigate and 
punish irresponsible commanders objectively. An optimistic 
assessment might accord with the judgment of long-serving 
Colombian senator Luis Carlos Avellaneda, who described the 
Colombian military’s proportionality doctrine as “still in its 
infancy.”290 Supporting this view is the recently institutionalized 
concern with human rights and the law of armed conflict in the 
Colombian National Army’s training and monitoring practices 
described here. However, a less forgiving interpretation, more 
consistent with the past readiness of Colombian military officers 
and courts to excuse the disproportionate, indiscriminate, and in 
some cases intentional killings of civilians who are allegedly 
sympathetic to the FARC, suggests not only has the rule of 
proportionality not been assiduously followed in the Colombian 
civil strife, but indeed the more fundamental principle of civilian 
immunity has been sometimes ignored with impunity. 
Certainly, logic favors the position that, if disregarding the 
risk of an armed attack to civilians in an international conflict is 
unethical, it is no less unethical to do so in an internal conflict. 
If anything, the moral imperative is stronger in the latter case; 
the world public order is premised on each state’s primary 
responsibility to protect its own nationals.291 Ethical theory and 
international law have not always coincided, in part because, the 
ius in bello developed as a doctrine of international law, which 
did not historically closely regulate the state’s treatment of its 
own nationals. With the modern expansion of international law 
to encompass state relations with individuals, most pertinently 
as holders of internationally recognized human rights and 
protections from proscribed behavior during an armed conflict, 
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the distinction between state legal obligations for the protection 
of civilians in international and non-international armed 
conflicts is no longer viable.292 The international law protecting 
civilians is no longer grounded in the state’s utilitarian interest 
in its citizens as producers of wealth or power for the state. It is 
now grounded in a general concern for the value of individual 
lives, sometimes expressed as “human dignity,” regardless of the 
presence or absence of an armed conflict. The circumstance of 
internal disturbance or civil strife may be thought to relax state 
obligations to protect individual civilians as much as it does 
during an international armed conflict, but certainly no more so. 
To the extent our data permit generalization, the Colombian 
civil strife neither clearly confirms nor disconfirms recognition 
that the proportionality principle applies in non-international 
armed conflicts. Critical evidence of opinio iuris has been lacking 
during almost the entirety of the conflict, i.e. between 1965 and 
2008. At most, it can be said with confidence that Colombia has 
come to openly recognize the applicability to the conflict of 
Common Article 3 and the mandate of Additional Protocol II to 
afford “general protection” to the civilian population. While some 
evidence indicates that the Colombian National Army operates 
by a de facto code of proportionality some of the time, the 
Colombian Air Force appears to have suffered many lapses in 
incorporating proportionality analysis into its targeting 
decisions. Whether these lapses resulted from insufficient 
training and supervision, or from a conscious decision to 
disregard risks to civilian lives, is unclear and will perhaps 
always remain so. 
As for the formal criminal enforcement machinery, the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights concluded in the case of 
Vélez Restrepo v. Colombia that the Colombian military justice 
system “is not the competent system of justice to investigate and, 
as appropriate, prosecute and punish the authors of human 
rights violations . . . .”293 This pronouncement accords with 
modern Colombian practice of treating attacks on civilians as 
outside the scope of military duty. In the case of intentional 
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attacks, such reasoning makes perfect sense. However, it cannot 
intelligibly apply to claims of indiscriminate or disproportionate 
attack, which fit better into the lex specialis of the law of armed 
conflict than international human rights law, and appear to fall 
within military jurisdiction under article 221 of the Colombian 
constitution. By definition, such attacks are directed at military 
objectives, and as such they fall within normal combatant duties. 
It appears instead that this doctrine results not from a 
logical conceptual division, but rather distrust of the Colombian 
military justice system arising from its troubled history. It 
reflects the pattern of exoneration by Colombian military 
tribunals in cases of apparently disproportionate, if not 
indiscriminate, attacks, as well as straightforward murders of 
civilians by combatants. The multiple instances of 
uninvestigated or unpunished killings of civilians viewed as 
sympathetic to FARC implies that a protective and nuanced 
proportionality principle, and the respect for civilian lives this 
principle reflects, were far from pervasively penetrating 
Colombian military culture during the long history of its internal 
conflict. 
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Appendix 
Initial Interview Protocol for Foreign Military 
Representatives 
1) Las unidades militares en el camp siempre o generalmente 
incluyen un consejo legal entrenado en las leyes de guerra? 
A) En caso de que si, ¿este consejero legal es militar? 
¿Qué puesto o rango ocupa? 
B) ¿Cuál es la cantidad mínima de unidades militares de 
la cual un consejero militar es responsable? 
C) ¿El consejero militar, esta involucrado 
automáticamente en tomar decisiones o solo cuando un 
comandante lo pide? ¿Existen algunas reglas donde se 
establezca cuando un comandante militar debería 
consultar ayuda legal durante operaciones activas? 
 
 
2) Como son entrenados comandantes, soldados y pilotos en las 
reglas de guerra? 
A) ¿El entrenamiento básico incluye instrucción en las 
leyes de guerra? 
B) ¿Los soldados o comandantes, reciben algún manual 
describiendo sus derechos y obligaciones bajo la 
convención de Geneva o protocolos adicionales? 
C) ¿Si los comandantes tiene preguntas sobre sus 
obligaciones bajo la ley internacional, tiene manera de 
preguntarle a algún consejero legal? 
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3) ¿Cuál es el protocolo para los comandantes al calcular la 
probabilidad y el numero de muertes civiles? 
A) ¿Antes de comenzar la operación militar crean una 
lista de no atacar? 
B) ¿Las operaciones y decisiones deben ser aprobados por 
un oficial de alto rango? En caso que si, ¿Qué puesto o 
rango ocupa? 
C) ¿La organización militar tiene reglas de enganche en 
la adición de las reglas generales de las leyes de guerra y 
la proporcionalidad en particular? 
I) En caso de que sí, ¿Son clasificados o publicas? 
II) En caso de que sí y sean publicas ¿Dónde podría 
conseguirlas? 
D) ¿La organización militar tiene un método establecido 
para medir daño colateral? 
I) En caso de que sí, ¿Es clasificado o publico? 
II) En caso de que sí y sea publico, ¿Dónde podría yo 
encontrarlo? 
III) En case que sí, y sean clasificados, ¿Existe algún 
resumen? Donde podría encontrarlo? 
 
 
4) ¿Su organización militar mantiene vigente el numero de 
muertes civiles y el daño a propiedades causado por sus 
operaciones? ¿Cómo? 
A) ¿Cuáles son las consecuencias que hacia un 
comandante militar al tomar decisiones que causan 
muertes civiles excesivas? 
B) ¿Su organización incluye algún consejero legal u otra 
persona independiente que evalué lo legal del 
comportamiento en el camp de batalla? 
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5) ¿Su organización tiene sus propias cortes y jueces en general? 
A) En caso de que si, ¿Están abiertas al publico? 
I) ¿Existe publicidad en los castigos? 
1) Si no, ¿Existen resúmenes del veredicto? 
B) En caso de que no, ¿Cómo manejan cuando existe una 
violación de las leyes de guerra? ¿Por cortes publicas? 
¿Cuál otro motivo? 
 
 
6) ¿Con quién podríamos hablar para conseguir mas información 
sobre sus entrenamientos, monitoreo y practicas en forzadas? 
¿Cómo podríamos comunicarnos con esa persona? 
 
